Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1994-95 Term by Lessard, Hester et al.
The Peter A. Allard School of Law
Allard Research Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1996
Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1994-95
Term
Hester Lessard
Bruce Ryder
David Schneiderman
Margot Young
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, myoung@allard.ubc.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Allard Research Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard Research Commons.
Citation Details
David Schneiderman, Hester Lessard, Bruce Ryder & Margot Young, "Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1994-95 Term"
(1996) 7 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 81.
I~
(
I
DEVELOPMENTS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THE 1994-95 TERM
Hester Lessard
Bruce Ryder
David Schneiderman
Margot Young*
1. INTRODUCTION
The past year's decisions display an expanding area of judicial
consensus with respect to the focus of Charter protections. The cen-
tral political figure in the landscape of the Canadian polity appears
to emerge strikingly and most simply as the familiar individual of
classical liberal theory, a particle of will and self-interest too abstract
to have much character or texture. Absent is explicit judicial recogni-
tion of personal markings th'at grant detail, group membership, or
particularity to this image.
We are provided, however, with an account of the institutions and
practices through which this political actor presumably has chosen to
pursue happiness and well-being. The key features of this backdrop
are the traditional patriarchal marriage, a belief in scientific reason,
tolerance of individual religious choices, and respect for the individ-
ual achievements of the talented and industrious. Such is the com-
posite picture of civil society which emerges from a careful piecing
together ofthe winning and losing situations ofthe various real indi-
viduals who are the litigants in this Term's cases.
Working backwards from this set of constitutionally recognized and
protected social choices, one is able to flesh out the creature who fic-
tively populates the realm of the Canadian Charter ofRights and Free-
.dams. It turns out he is socially male. He defines himselfin terms ofhis
professional reputation; he is heterosexual, married or in a "marriage-
* Hester Lessard is Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria.
Bruce Ryder is Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. David
Schneiderman is Executive Director, Centre for Constitutional Studies, University of
Alberta. Margot Young is Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria.
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like" relationship. He is the breadwinner on whom his family depends
and whose priorities shape the family unit even after separation and
divorce. He is not a member of a subordinated cultural or religious com-
munity. He is tolerant of the personal choices made by others so long as
they do not challenge his own moral vision and do not amount to the
extraction of concessions on behalf of self-interested groups. Although
he places his faith in the free flow of ideas to ensure the maintenance of .
democracy and political accountability, that faith is tempered by anxi-
eties concerning an unstable social order and the loss of social status.
While this judicial creation is neither surprising nor new, one can-
not help but notice the virtual disappearance of alternative accounts
of social relations or beings. In particular, only L'Heureux-DuM J:
still seems committed to the notion that the individual, although
treasuring autonomy above all, is inevitably situated within a
diverse, often contradictory, network of specific political and social
relations determining the texture and meaning of both self and com-
munity. In the past, this variation on the classical liberal theme has
produced decisions in which the Supreme Court of Canada strove to
make the Charter relevant to social justice and the claims of the
most marginalized and powerless within Canadian society. No longer
does this seem to be a concern of the majority of the Court.
Our essay this year explores the apparent triumph of the individual
of classical liberalism. We trace in the various decisions of this Term
this common thread. Yet, our analysis also examines the' particular
way in which this political imagery of the individual is compounded by
its interaction with judicial assumptions about important social insti-
tutions: the family, religion, media, and the state. What is revealed is
the judicial adoption of an intricate social and political map in' which
abstract individualism combines with, and often masks, traditional,
conservative images of social order and. moral choice.
This combination of the liberal individual with conservative moral
ordering should not be strange to us, for it is evocative ofthe neo-conser-
vatism which increasingly dominates mainstream politics of western
nations. Clustered together in politics are a number ofelements: the tri-
umph of individualism over collectivism; increased hostility to complex
equality claims; rejection of the redistributive logic of the welfare state
and the interventionist role of a central government; enshrinement of
laissez-faire economics; and, conservative conceptions of morality and
religion. l It is this constellation of political values that lends coherence
to the current Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence.
I Resnick, "The Ideology of Neo-Conservatism", in McCullough (ed.), Political
Ideologies and Political Philosophies (1989).
In exploring this understanding of recent Supreme Court politics,
we begin with a brief summary of the Court's decisions with respect
to federalism and the division of powers. This is then followed by
several sections which explore the Court's increasing reliance on the
imagery and rhetoric associated with classical liberalism and, in par-
ticular, on the notion of the rights holder as an abstract unencum-
bered unit of undifferentiated will and desire. For example, Part III
traces the shift in analysis under section 15 of the Charter in the
cases of Egan v. Canada2 and Miron v. Trudel3 to more formal under-
standings of equality and away from historically and socially situ-
ated notions of the individual rights holder. Part IV explores some of
the practical consequences of this ideological shift in terms of the
increase in judicial resistance towards recognizing positive obliga-
tions on the government to facilitate access to Charter rights and
freedoms.
The next two sections illustrate the combination of individualism
and traditional morality which we have identified as the central fea-
ture of neo-conservatism. In these sections, we focus on the role of
the family and religious institutions in the judicial construction of
Canadian civil society. Thus, in Part V, we return to the equality
cases to examine the way in which the imagery of the free and ratio-
nal individual is used to legitimate and, to some extent, sanctify
state privileging of heterosexist and patriarchal familial relations.
This theme is continued in Part VI which discusses the case ofB.(R.)
v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Thronto.4 Here the focus is
on the way in which subordinated religious and cultural communi-
ties are inevitably portrayed as irrational and dangerous within the
lexicon of reasonable limits on negative spheres of individual choice
which has become orthodox in the analysis of the fundamental free-
doms in section 2 of the Charter.
In Part VII, we turn to yet another pivotal institution in the organi-
zation ofliberal societies, namely, the media. In this Part, we draw out
the contrasting political roles the Court assigns to the media in its
decisions in Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Dagenais5 and Hill v.
Church of Scientology of Thronto. 6 These cases deal with the con-
straints imposed on freedom of expression by court-ordered publica-
2 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513.
, [19951 2 S.C.R. 418.
• [1995J 1 S.C.R. 315.
o [1994J 3 S.C.R. 835.
• [1995J 2 S.C.R. 1130.
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tion bans and defamation law respectively. In addition to highlighting
the difficulties posed for legal ordering by the development of new
communication technologies, our discussion considers the political
logic underlying the striking contrast in the Court's treatment of the
privacy interests of criminal defendants in Dagenais and those of
defamed professionals in Hill. We continue our analysis of Dagenais
and Hill in Part VIII by examining the manner in which the Court
resolves the threshold issue for both these cases of the Charter's appli-
cation to judicially-developed limits on freedom of expression. In this
penultimate section of the essay, we argue that the Court's willingness
to apply Charter values to the development of the common law is bet-
ter understood as an affirmation rather than a rejection of the familiar
divide between public and private. Finally, we conclude with some
observations about how this Term's decisions ought to affect our
understanding of the politics of the Charter generally.
II. FEDERALISM
Before embarking on an exploration of our major themes,a small
detour is necessary to explain why we devote so little space to a dis-
cussion of federalism issues in this essay. The focus of our analysis is
on Charter decisions for a simple reason: this Term the Court did not
issue any decisions dealing with aboriginal rights, and in its only two
division of powers decisions, the Court issued cursory one paragraph
judgments dismissing the appeals.
While clearly the Charter continues to dominate the Court's con-
stitutional agenda, the near complete absence of other issues on the
docket this Term is unusual. It may be partly just a fortuitous hiatus,
as in the coming Terms we will see some of the Court's attention turn
to defining the scope of the federal criminal law7 and peace, order
and good government powers,8 and to deciding a number of pivotal
appeals in relation to aboriginal rights.9
Yet it appears that another part of the explanation is that the
Court did a poor job of managing its federalism docket this Term.
One wonders, for example, why leave was granted in the Transgas
case.10 Tallis J.A. had written a thorough and convincing judgment
7 RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995J 3 S.C.R. 199.
8 A-G. Canada v. Hydro-Quebec, [1995] A.Q. No. 143 (C.A.), leave to appeal to
S.C.C. granted, E.S.C.C., October 13, 1995.
• See, e.g., Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1993), 104 D.L.R. (4th) 470
(RC.C.A.): leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted, 170 N.R. 363n.
10 Transgas Ltd. v. Mid-Plains Contractors Ltd., [1994J 3 S.C.R. 753.
on behalf of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal ll upholding a provi-
sion of the federal Income Tax Act that permitted Revenue Canada to
collect tax owed from the creditors of tax debtors. Justice Tallis con-
cluded that the encroachment on provincial jurisdiction in relation to
property and civil rights was necessarily incidental to a valid tax col-
lection scheme. This approach was consistent with recent judgments
of the Supreme Court that have given both federal and provincial
taxation powers a liberal interpretation. 12 It was hard to discern the
new or controversial points that would be raised on appeal. Not sur-
prisingly, the Court agreed summarily with Tallis J.A. in an oral
judgment from the bench.
In the only other federalism decision of the Term, the Court also
summarily dismissed the appeal from the bench. The federalism
issue raised by Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. 13 was the extent to
which provincial environmental protection statutes could validly
apply to federally-regulated undertakings. Given that this was the
first Supreme Court decision to consider the application of the inter-
jurisdictional immunity doctrine in the environmental context, the
Court's cursory dismissal- of the federalism issue is perplexing. The
Ontario Court of Appeal had upheld the application of the chal-
lenged provision (dealing with the emission of contaminants) on the
grounds that the Environmental Protection Act "as a whole" is not
"aimed at management".14 This appeared to be a different test for
interjurisdictional immunity - one more friendly to provincial juris-
diction - than that most recently propounded by the Supreme Court
in Bell Canada v. Quebec (CSST) .15 The Supreme Court affirmed,
saying simply16 that the issue was determined by the Privy Council's
1899 decision in Notre Dame de Bonsecours. 17 Constitutional lawyers
who bothered to dust off copies of the Appeal Cases will have discov-
ered that the Bonsecours decision turned on the distinction between
11 (1993),101 D.L.R. (4th) 238 (Sask. C.A.).
IZ Reference re Goods and Services Tax, [1992J 2 S.C.R. 446; Reference re: Quebec
Sales Tax, (1994) 2 S.C.R. 715; Allard Contractors Ltd. u. Coquitlam (District), [1993J
4 S.C.R. 37i.
13 [19951 2 S.C.R. 1031.
14 Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. (1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 255 (Ont. C.A.).
16 [1988J 1 S.C.R. 749. This case suggests that any provision of a provincial law
must be read down ifit has the effect oftouching matters that are "an essential part of
the management of a federal undertaking".
,. Supra, note 13, at para. 32.
17 Canadian PacifIC Railway Co. v. Notre Dame de Bonsecours (Parish), [18991
A.C.367.
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the structure of railway ditches and their maintenance. Lord Watson
said a provincial law could apply only to the latter. How this arcane
distinction is to guide decision-making in relation to modern environ-
mental statutes, and how it is to be squared with the more conceptu-
ally ambitious pronouncements on the inteIjurisdictional immunity
doctrine emanating from the late twentieth century case law, are
matters that, curiously, the Court decided not to discuss. We are left
to surmise that the Court does not deem the maintenance of physical
facilities to be essential parts of the management of federal under-
takings and, thus, the inteIjurisdictional immunity doctrine is not
applicable.
Meanwhile, the justices were denying leave to appeal in a number
of cases that raised interesting and unresolved constitutional issues.
They denied leave to appeal a Saskatchewan ruling that provincial
labour laws could apply to provincial government employees engaged
in the federally-regulated activity of aeronautics,18 despite an appar-
ently conflicting result in Ontario.19 Leave was denied to a British
Columbia ruling that plaintiffs in maritime tort actions could not
claim the advantages 'of provincial dependants' claims legislation,20
despite the fact that the Supreme Court has upheld the application
of provincial contributory negligence statutes in the same context.21
Also, leave was denied to a New Brunswick ruling that provisions of
the provincial Medical Act authorizing the suspension of a licence of
any doctor performing abortions outside a hospital were, in pith and
substance, criminal law and thus invalid,22 despite the obvious differ-
ences between these provisions and the Nova Scotia legislation
struck down for the same reasons in the Court's most recent Morgen-
taler23 judgment.
In sum, members of the Court chose not to use their limited time
and resources to fine-tune the division of powers doctrine this Term.
,. Canadian Assn, of Fire Bomber Pilots v. Saskatchewan, (1993), 119 Sask. R.
161 (Q.B.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, unreported, summarized in B.8.C.C.,
February 3, 1995, at 254.
19 Ontario Public Service Employees Union v. Ontario (1994), 16 O.R. (3d) 735
(Div. Ct.).
20 Shulman v. McCallum (1993), 79 E.C.L.R. (2d) 393 (CA); leave to appeal to
S.C.C. refused, unreported, summarized in B.S.C.C., May 20, 1994, at 853.
21 Stein v. The Ship "Kathy K", [1976] 2 S.C.R. 802.
22 Morgentaler v. New Brunswick (Attorney General) (1995), 121 D.L.R. (4th) 431
(N.E.C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, unreported, summarized in E.S.C.C.,
August 25, 1995, at 1311.
23 R. v. Morgentaler, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463.
Even when the judges came close to doing so, as in Transgas 24 and
Canadian Pacific Ltd.,25 they appear to have become bored by the
prospect. It is the Charter that captured the Court's constitutional
attention this Term. And, thus, it is to an analysis of the Charter
decisions that we now turn for the balance of our paper.
III. ABSTRACT INDMDUALISM AND THE PATH NOT TAKEN
As noted in our introduction, the shift to the unencumbered indi-
vidual as paradigmatic rights holder is observed most clearly in the
equality cases ofJhis term. Since Andrews v. Law Society of British
Columbia26 and 'until this Term's equality decisions, two different
approaches to equality doctrine have been in contention. One
approach, best represented by McIntyre J.'s rejection of the "simi-
larly situated" test in Andrews and picked up in Wilson J.'s judg-
ments in the same case and in R. v. Turpin ,21 stresses a
contextualized, substantive understanding of equality. Consider-
ation of an equality claim under section 15 was to be a contextual
inquiry, looking to the larger social, political and legal context of the
group in question.:JAbsent this, Wilson J. warned, "the section 15
analysis may become a mechanical and sterile categorization process
conducted entirely within the four corners of the impugned legisla-
tion."28 The individual who emerged from this understanding was
situated in and only understood in reference to the larger social
groupings and contexts which structured her or his identity, entering
the analysis already contoured and made concrete by her or his polit-
ical and historical environment. The equality concern was to prevent
the perpetuation and exacerbation of pre-existing inequality: to pro-
tect the historically and systemically vulnerable and to remedy past
discrimination. Thus, in Swain, Lamer J. wrote: "... the overall pur-
pose of s. 15 [is] to remedy or prevent discrimination against groups
subject to stereotyping, historical disadvantage and political and
social prejudice in Canadian society."29
24 Supra, note 1O.
26 Supra, note 13.
" [1989]1 S.C.R. 143.
21 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296.
28 Id., at 1332.
29 R. v. Swain, [19911 1 S.C.R. 933 at 992. See also Wilson J.'s judgment in
Thrpin, supra, note 27, at 1333 identifying the purposes of s. 15 to be "remedying or
preventing discrimination against groups suffering social, political, and legal disad-
vantage in our society".
88 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7(2d):81 1996] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 89
With this same equality goal in mind, Wilson J. stated in Turpin:
... it is important to look not only at the impugned legislation which has
created a distinction that violates the right to equality but also to the
larger social, political and legal context...
Accordingly, it is only by examining the larger context that a court can
determine whether differential treatment results in inequality or
whether, contrariwise, it would be identical treatment which would in the
particular context result in inequality or foster disadvantage. A finding
that there is discrimination will, I think, in most but perhaps not all cases
necessarily entail a search for disadvantage that exists apart from and
independent of the particular legal distinction being challenged.so
r The second approach to equality doctrine, also distilled within
McIntyre J.'s judgment in Andrews,31 prescribes a more formal fram-
ing of equality conflicts. While recognizing the fact that similar treat-
ment is not always equal treatment, proponents of this perspective
argued that the prioritizing of equality claims required by the dis-
crete and insular minority approach ran counter to fundamental
equality principles.~2Instead, some have located within McIntyre J.'s
judgment a more formal understanding of equality, highlighting his
statement that
[djistinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an individ-
ual solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the
charge of discrimination, while those based on an individual's merits and
capacities will rarely be so classed.s3
r
The markers of discrimination are here irrelevant stereotyping
and group identification; the character and history of the group in
question are not criticalJ
The debate over what vision of equality should be captured by sec-
tion 15(1) thus centred on the meaning of the notion of discrimina-
tion. The first two stages of McIntyre J.'s inquiry in Andrews -
30 Supra, note 27, at 1331-32.
31 McIntyre J.'s judgment in Andrews is, perhaps, most remarkable for its ability
to be anything to anyone. At different moments, McIntyre J. rejected the similarly sit-
uated test (supra, note 26, at 166-68), implicitly adopted the relevancy test which is
the hallmark of the similarly situated test (at 174-75) and endorsed a contextual anal-
ysis (at 164).
32 See, e.g., Gibson, Tfw Law of the Charter: Equality Rights (1990), at 150-57.
Gibson writes that such a reading of s. 15 would require a "gross distortion" of the text
of the section (id., at 152). A similar critique can be found in Hogg, Constitutional Law
ofCanada, 3rd ed. (1992) at 1171-76.
33 Supra, note 26, at 174-75.
identification of different treatment and of a consequential harm -
were uncontroversial. But whether or not, in order to constitute dis-
crimination, such a harm had to exacerbate an existing group ine-
quality or merely impose group stereotyping (which meant
distinctions not based on nature, merit, or choice) remained in issue.
Equality cases which followed Andrews and Turpin illustrate the
tension between these two conceptual strands. In Weatherall v. Can-
ada (Attorney General),34 a case involving male prisoners denied the
guarantee granted to female prisoners of having frisk searches and
patrols conducted only by prisoner guards of the same sex, the unan-
imous Court seemed unable to decide which approach to take. Jus-
tice La Forest's reasoning on behalf of the Court emphasized, first, a
fixed biological backdrop and, then, the social and historical reality
of the group to which the claimant belonged:
[g)iven the historical, biological and sociological ~ifferen~es betwee~ men
and women, equality does not demand that practlces whlch are forbldden
where male officers guard female inmates must also be banned where
female officers guard male inmates.35
In the next two sentences, he went on to note that the "historical
trend of violence perpetrated by men against women is not matched
by a comparable trend pursuant to which men are the victims" and
that "[b]iologically, a frisk search ... of a man's chest area ... does not
implic'ate the same concems".36 Jumbled together are assessments of
the group context of the male complainant and the question of
whether the distinction is one which is sensible in "nature". The
Court, thus, illustrated its inability or, perhaps, reluctance to pick
between the two conceptions of anti-discrimination protections.
Indeed, in its subsequent equality decisions, the Court continued to be
at pains to rationalize the result in Weatherall.
The ambiguous heritage ofAndrews continued to shape the equal-
ity landscape until the simultaneous release of the three major'
. . E 37 M' 38 d Th'b d 39equahty cases of thls Term - gan, ~ron an ~ au eau.
The Egan case involved a challenge to the denial of old age spousal
allowances to gay and lesbian couples. The Miron case involved a
34 (1993) 2 S.C.R. 872.
35 Id., at 877.
56 Id.
37 [19951 2 S.C.R. 513.
38 119951 2 S.C.R. 418.
39 Thibaudeau u. R., 119951 2 S.C.R. 627.
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challenge by an individual, in an unmarried heterosexual relation-
ship, to the constitutionality of providing certain statutory disability
benefits in automobile insurance contracts only to married couples.
At issue in Thibaudeau was the validity of the "inclusion/deduction
scheme" for the treatment of child support payments under the
Income Tax Act.40 We will return to a discussion of the particular
issues raised by these cases in Part V below. For the moment, we will
focus on the general approaches to section 15(1) of the Charter set
out by the judges in Egan and Miron, for it was in these two cases
that the Court clearly communicated which of the two senses of
eguality it now favours.
r With the exception of L'Heureux-DuM J., the judges all rejected the
substantive approach - and its contextualized individual - articu-
lated in earlier Charter equality jurisprudence. Lost is a sense of dis-
crimination as a phenomenon uniquely affecting groups identified as
vulnerable or relatively powerless. Instead, discrimination in the eyes
of the Court hasbecome simply the mistreatment of individuals on the
basis ofgroup stereotypes: a failure to treat individuals in terms of the
individual qualities of merit, choice, or nature - the typical character-
istics ofdifferentiation which are taken to "make sense".:.l
I The test adopted by Gonthier and La Forest JJ. in Miron andIEgan, respectively, and concurred in by Lamer C.J. and Major J. in
t both cases, is clearest in its rejection ofa substantive approach to
\ equality doctrine and the accompanying contextualized understand-
I ing of the individual. Justice Gonthier's dissent in Miron most
'clearly articulated this rejection. Here, Gonthier J. began by setting
out the three elements necessary to establish a violation of section
15: first, a legislative distinction between the claimant and others
that, second, results in a disadvantage, burden, or obligation and,
that, third is based on an "irrelevant personal characteristic" which
is either enumerated in section 15(1) or analogous to enumerated
groundS.41 The third step breaks down further into a determination
of, first, the personal characteristic shared by the group singled out
by the legislation and, second, the relevancy of such a characteristic
given the functional values underlying the legislation.42
This latter branch of the third step - the inquiry into the relevancy
of the distinguishing personal characteristic of the group singled out
by the legislation - marks Gonthier J.'s departure from the first and
'0 For a description of this scheme, see the text accompanying note 126, infra.
" Supra, note 38, at 435. .
.. Id., at 436.
more substantive strand of earlier equality jurisprudence. The focus is
no longer the context of the group with which the individual claimant 1
is aligned and the exacerbation of a pre-existing contextual disadvan-
tage by the legislative distinction at issue. Instead, at issue only is the
character of the distinction drawn and the place such a distinction
occupies within "physical or biological reality, or fundamental ,
value[s]".43 Invocation of the protection offered by section 15(1)
requires only a finding of an "irrelevant" distinction: a distinction
which fails to map on to some judicially identified and legislatively
mirrored moral or natural truth.44 Thus, this test bears no conceptual
link to the enumerated or analogous grounds approach and the pre-
existing group context of disadvantage that approach required.
Justice Gonthier did, nevertheless, still lay claim to a contextual;
approach, stating that: 1
[c]ontext is indispensable to identifying the appropriate groups to be com-
pared, to determining whether prejudice flows from the distinction, and
to assessing the nature and relevancy of the personal characteristic upon
which the distinction is drawn.·s
However, such a discussion seems no more than an obligatory nod to \
past jurisprudential warnings about the aridity of a decontextualized
analysis. Justice Ganthier did not allow the larger social and historical
pattern of Canadian society to enter into his analysis - although this
is, of course, the context to which past judgments allude. In fact,
Ganthier J. explicitly rejected an analysis that would allow pre-exist-
ing contexts of privilege or disadvantage to determine equality assess-
ments: "membership in such a disadvantaged group is not an essential
precondition for bringing a claim under section 15 of the Charter."46
The individual claimant in Ganthier J.'s analysis must establish his or !
" Id., at 438.
.. Justice Gonthier did allow that the finding of a fit between a legislatively
identified value and the characteristics upon which a legislative distinction is drawn
will not always be enough to indicate the absence of discrimination. Such a finding
will not suffice where "the underlying values" of the legislation themselves "are irrele-
vant to any legitimate legislative purpose". Id., at 436. Relevancy would then be
assessed by reference to an enumerated or analogous ground of s. 15. Id. Such an
examination into the larger relevancy of the legislative values at stake was, however,
unnecessary in Miron. Justice Gonthier had little difficulty identifying and accepting
as legitimate the Insurance Act's privileging of marriage over other intimate living
arrangements. Id. at 461-62.
" Id., at 437-38.
•• Id., at 436. 'lb the extent that such a context of disadvantage is relevant, it is
only as an indication that the distinction in question is drawn on the basis of an irrel-
evant personal characteristic.
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her claim of discrimination in abstraction from the larger social con-
text. Discrimination signals not the exacerbation of group inequality
but, rather, the denial of individual uniqueness and autonomy. Irrele-
vant stereotyping is an individual, not a group, harm. Contextualiza-
tion, thus, for Gonthier J., must have a more confined role. It is to be
used to manipulate the findings of the first and second steps ofhis test.
- characterization of group membership and the effect of the legisla-
tive distinction - but not to preserve the powerful anti-majoritarian
force of equality protections for those against whom the majority most
often acts: the already disadvantaged minorities of our society. At the
third stage of Gonthier J.'s inquiry, context matters only in the sense of
the legislative and, if necessary, larger "natural" backdrop ofvalue and
judgment against which the relevancy assessment is made,J
The result is that Gonthier J.'s test frames the eqllality issues at
stake in terms of the very contexts - those of "traditional values"
and "common sense" - that equality theory at its best must chal-
lenge. After all, it has been traditional values - in both their legisla-
tive and social manifestations - which have left us our rich legacy of
discrimination. If equality theory challenges only laws at odds with
such values, then much that is problematic from an equality perspec-
tive will be left unrevealed. Thus, the context that shapes and con-
strains Gonthier J.'s analysis is precisely the context that a rigorous
equality analysis demands be scrutinized.
While glaringly out of line with some past equality jurisprudence,
Gonthier J.'s analysis is less original than one might at first glance
assume.47 Certainly in his explicit reliance on the notion of relevancy
his test differs from other previous tests. 48 But, as Gonthier J. him-
self pointed out, the requirement of relevancy is simply a logical gen-
eralization of McIntyre J.'s exclusion of distinctions based on merit or
" For example, Leon Trakman has described Gonthier J.'s assertion of legisla-
tive relevance as "novel·, claiming that Gonthier J. diverged from Andrews: "Section
15: Equality? Where?" (1995), 6 Constitutional Forum 112 at 114.
.. Importation of the question of relevancy, or means/ends fit into the s. 15(1) stage
of analysis was strongly and convincingly criticized by the five judges who did not sub-
scribe to Gonthier J.'s approach in the equality trilogy. See L'Heureux-DuM J. in Egan,
supra, note 37, at 546-48; Cory and Iacobucci JJ. in Thibaudeau, supra, note 37, at 700-
01, and McLachlin J. in Miron, supra, note 38, at 487-92 (Sopinka J. concurring). In
addition to pointing out that Gonthier and La Forest JJ. were willing to sanctify dis-
criminatory ends as "fundamental values·, the other judgments argued that Gonthier
J.'s relevancy test confuses s. 15 functions with those ofs. 1. It does this, they argued, by
imposing a higher burden on the claimant and, as well, by importing into s. 15 elements
of the s. 1 proportionality test. Gonthier J. re'sponded, rather unconvincingly, by distin-
guishing "relevancy" from "reasonableness· (Miron, id., at 444-46).
capacity from the charge of discrimination. As Gonthier J. wrote: "00.
a criterion defined in terms of stereotype based on presumed group
characteristics, rather than on the basis of merit, capacity or circum-
stances, is but an elaboration of the concept of relevance."49
Moreover, the relevancy test Gonthier J. mapped out is a return, ;
albeit indirectly, to the much reviled but never wholly abandoned \
"similarly situated" test with all its attendant problems.50 This is I
illustrated by the fact that, in Miron, Gonthier J. pressed the point
that "unmarried couples are not in a situation identical to married
spouses with respect to mutual support obligations".51
Nowhere are the weaknesses of Gonthier J.'s approach clearer
than in its application in La Forest J.'s judgment in Egan. At issue
in Egan was the constitutionality of a provision of the Old Age
Security Act52 that limited to heterosexual partners (married or liv-
ing common law for at least one year) the right to claim spousal
allowances. These allowances are designed to alleviate the poverty
of elderly couples where one spouse is over 65 and thus receiving
an old age pension, the other is between the ages of 60 and 65, and
the combined income of the couple falls below a statutory cut-off.
James Egan and John Nesbit, having lived together since 1948 in
an intimate, interdependent and committed relationship, applied
for a spousal allowance when Nesbit reached age 60. The applica-
tion was rejected because it was found that Nesbit was not a
"spouse" as defined in the Act. Egan and Nesbit claimed that the
statutory definition of "spouse" contravened section 15, as it dis-
criminates on the basis of sexual orientation. While Egan and Nes-
bit ultimately lost their constitutional challenge, the Court did rule
for the first time that section 15(1) protects against discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation53 and a majority found that the
" ld., at 443.
., For a detailed discussion of these problems, see Philipps and Young, "Sex, Tax,
and the Charter: A Review of Thibaudeau u. Canada" (1995), 2 Review of Constitu-
tional Studies 221 at 230-34.
61 Supra, note 38, at 460-61.
'2 RS.C. 1985, c. 0-9, s. 2.
.3 The recognition in Egan, supra, note 37, that sexual orientation is a ground
of discrimination analogous to those enumerated in s. 15 can be found in the judg-
ments of La Forest J. at 528-29 and Cory J. at 599-603. L'Heureux-DuM J. also con-
cluded (at 566-67) that gays and lesbians are entitled to s. 15 protection since they
"are a highly socially vulnerable group, in that they have suffered considerable his-
torical disadvantage, stereotyping, marginalization and stigmatization within
Canadian society."
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legislative defmition of spouse as a person of the opposite sex was
discriminatory.54
Gay rights activists and various commentators have made much of
this recognition that sexual orientation falls within the ambit of sec-
tion 15 protection as an analogous ground. Yet this recognition
flowed in part from the debateable assertion that sexual orientation
is a fixed feature: as La Forest J. put it, "a deeply personal character- .
istic that is either unchangeable or changeable only at unacceptable
personal costS."55 While recognition of sexual orientation as an analo-
gous ground is certainly an important symbolic victory, the actual
substance of the section 15 and section 1 analyses which accompany
this recognition makes it possible that gay and lesbian rights cases
may provide little more than rhetorical solace in Charter cases in the
near future.
Justice La Forest's judgment for the four members of the section
15 minority,56 adopting the methodology set out by Gonthier J. in
Miron, is the clearest example of this substantive failure. This judg-
ment, through its manipulation of context, illustrates how Gonthier
J.'s analysis provides ample opportunity for the re-insertion of judi-
cial bias - in this instance, homophobia. The remarkable character
of La Forest J.'s judgment lies in its failure to recognize the harm at
stake in this sort of case, all the while claiming the constitutionaliza-
tion ofprotection against discrimination on the grounds of sexual ori-
entation. Observable is an unfortunate alignment of judicial and
legislative prejudice.
Having worked his way through the first two steps of Gonthier J.'s
formula and identified a legislative distinction which results in dis-
advantage, La Forest J. set out to assess whether or not this distinc-
tion is a relevant one (the second aspect of Gonthier J.'s test). That is,
La Forest J., sought to identify the "functional values" underlying
the Old Age Security Act, in order to determine the relevancy ofthe
personal characteristic at stake here - sexual orientation - to these1/~'\:.t<J· ) values. What follows from this inquiry is a judicial parade of the
~~ same sort of prejudice that plagues the legislation in the first place:
marriage as a fundamental institution from time immemorial,
.. Only four judges of this majority ruled that the violation could not be saved
under s. 1. Sopinka J., the fifth judge, found that the Charter infringement could be
justified, with the result that the challenge was unsuccessful and the provision defin-
ing spouse remains unchanged.
66 Supra, note 37, at 528.
66 Lamer C.J., Gonthier and Major JJ. concurring.
reflecting long-standing philosophical and religious tradition, with a
firm anchor in biological and social realities tied to procreation and
the nurture of children.57 La Forest J. continued, these "basic social
interests and policies" are equally present in the statute's recogni-
tion of common law heterosexual relationships, but not in other rela-
tionships, including same-sex relationships.58 Thus the legislative
distinction was supported by its relevancy to the fundamental, het-
erosexist values of the statute. The conclusion was that legislative
support of heterosexual family units is not arbitrary and is therefore
legitimate under section 15.59
Nor does the legislation, according to La Forest J., single out
same-sex couples for special, discriminatory treatment. By capturing
what is of value and distinction in different sex relationships, La
Forest J. effectively forestalled any discussion of other factors that
might possibly reveal what is special about same-sex couples or both
infertile and non-procreative different sex relationships. Also, in
case anyone remains concerned about the fact that the benefit in
question goes to numerous couples without children, La Forest J.
cited the need to give Parliament "reasonable room to manoeuvre".60
Such sentiments invoke La Forest J.'s traditional deference to Par-
liament but do so with a nasty homophobic flair.
. Justices Gonthier and La Forest's use of the notion of "relevancy"
was criticized by McLachlin J. iIi Miron in a treatment of section
15(1) that is likely to garner the support of a majority of the Court in
the years ahead.61 Justice McLachlin prefaced her own exposition
with a discussion ofthe dangers of relying on relevancy as a guide to
section 15(1) infringements. While allowing that the absence ofrele-
vancy between the impugned distinction and functional valul;ls of the
legislation will signal discrimination, McLachlin J. recognized that
the presence of relevancy decides nothing:
67 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 at 535·37.
68 A set .of different reasons were given for making sense of this particular legis-
lative distinction. The first had to do with the vulnerable position of women, the sec-
ond with providing a reward for having had children.
69 Undoubtedly, the legislation's distinctions echo these sentiments; neverthe-
less, this tells us nothing about the adherence of these distinctions to equality objec-
tives.6. Supra, note 57, at 538.
51 Justices Sopinka, Cory and Iacobucci joined her reasons, and L'Heureux-DuM
J.'s views, discussed below, are much closer to this liberal block than they are to the
GonthierlLa Forest JJ. conservative minority.
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... it does not follow from a finding that a group characteristic is relevant
to the legislative aim that the legislator has employed that characteristic
in a manner which does not perpetuate limitations, burdens and disad-
vantages in violation ofs. 15(1).62
Rather, McLachlin J. argued, the actual impact ofthe distinction on
members of the targeted group must be examined. Otherwise, she .
said, the promise of equality will not be met.63
i But, it is not clear that McLachlin J.'s own test under section 15(1)
"fulfils this promise either, as she too failed to elaborate a conception
: of equality that is adequately attentive to both the dangers of unex-
. plored stereotypical thinking and the effect of context on equality
claims. Ignored were her own warnings about the dangers of rele-
i vancy and how it can both broaden and narrow the range of equality
claims in problematic ways. The result is an application of equality
!theory that also fails to challenge fully traditional legislative values
Iand that reduces the equality rubric to one that encompasses only
I individually based harms.
Justice McLachlin defined the purpose underlying section 15(1) as
prevention of "the imposition of limitations, disadvantages or bur-
dens through the stereotypical application of presumed group char-
acteristics rather than on merit, capacity or circumstances".64
Fulfilment of this purpose requires a two-step test. The first step
involves an examination of whether equal protection or benefit has
been denied. The second step inquires into whether such a denial
constitutes discrimination.65 This latter inquiry will usually.be satis-
fied upon simply locating the distinction within an enumerated or
analogous ground. Exceptionally, this will not be sufficient. In those
cases, even though the distinction occurs along an enumerated or
analogous ground, it will not violate the purpose of section 15(1).66
This explains, McLachlin J. argued, the results in cases like Weather-
all and Turpin where an enumerated or analogous ground was
involved but ultimately no discrimination found.67
Justice McLachlin was hard pressed to account for these prece-
dents, as in each case the equality claim was defeated at least in part
because of the lack of relative disadvantage which underlay the
62 Miron, supra, note 57, at 488.
6' Id., at 488.90.
6. Id., at 492.
" Id.
66 Id.
67 Id., at 487.
group context of the individual complaint. Under McLachlin J.'s
analysis, such a use of group context is rejected. Section 15(1) looks
only to preservation of individual dignity through the prevention of
imposition of group stereotypes. Enumerated and analogous grounds
mark those grounds of distinction that rely on "irrelevant stereotypi-
cal group classifications".68Expansion of the list of recognized analo-
gous grounds thus involves, among other things,69 a determination of
whether or not the characteristic may function as
... an irrelevant basis ofexclusion and a denial of essential human dignity
in the human rig~ts tradition. In other words, may it serve as a basis for
unequal treatment based on stereotypical attributes ascribed to the
group, rather than on the true worth and ability or circumstances of the
individual?70
In this manner McLachlin J. confirmed the abstract, individualized f
focus of her understandin~of sec~ion 15(1) :- the harm th~ eq~ality
claimant suffers, and whlCh sectlon 15(1) IS to address, lies 10 the
reduction of the individual to his or her group context.
Also confirmed was McLachlin J.'s retention of the importance of I
the notion of relevancy, despite her criticism of Gonthier J. on this \
point. While McLachlin J. would not allow a simple ~ohere~ce i
between legislative intent and structure to defeat an equahty cl~Im, I
she did seem to allow that distinctions consistent ~th assumptlO~s !
about such matters as individual merit, worth or CIrcumstances will
alone excuse possibly harmful legislative line-drawing. These crite-
ria are contrasted to stereotypical assessments and, thus, are not
suspect for McLachlin J. within the general purposes of section
15(1). Distinctions are only problematic - or "inappropriate" to use
McLachlin J.'s termin610gy71 - when they run counter to an indi-
vidual's "true worth or entitlement".72
68 Id., at 495.
69 McLachlin J. discussed the other factors previous cases have held to be impor.
tant in the task of identifying analogous grounds. She allowed that such things as
historical disadvantage, constitution of a "discrete and insular minority", distinction
on the basis of a personal characteristic, and distinction based on an immutable char-
acteristic might all be additional valid indicators. However, McLachlin J. cautioned
that none of these factors are necessary elements of what constitutes an analogous
ground. Id., at 496.
70 Id., at 495.
71 Id., at 500·02.
72 Id., at 501.
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What is evil is not the ground of discrimination, but its inappropriate use
to deny equal protection and benefit to people who are members of the
marked groups -not on the basis of their true abilities or circumstance
but on the basis of the group to which they belong.73 '
~o, ~hile McLachlin J. wisely rejected Gonthier J.'s simple test of
legJ.s~atIverelevancy, she employed the only slightly more rigorous.
reqUIrement of individual relevancy: legislative distinctions must be
consistent with assumptions about individual merit and circum-
s~ance. Lost is recognition of the fact that many legislative distinc-
tions now condemned as discriminatory once conformed with
tra~tionalor dominant conceptions of merit, worth or circumstance.
~ustice M~Lachlin, thus, inserted into and legitimated within equal-
~ty ~~IYSIS assumptions that are most ideally challenged by equality
mquInes. She employed too facile an understanding ofthe social con-
struction and indeterminacy of notions of individual worth and cir-
I
~umstance. ~er analysis lacks the important acknowledgement that,
Just as today s stereotypes were yesterday's truths, so too are current
"appropriate" distinctions often revealable as our most insidious
forms of discrimination.
j
W,e are left with L'Heureux-DuM J.'s treatment of section 15(1) to
:etam th~ more ~ubst~tive and challenging understanding of equal-
Ity ~ssoc~ated WIth WIlson J.'s judgments in Andrews and Turpin.
Justice LHeureux-Dube presented what she labelled an alternative
p~rs~ec~ve.to ~ther analyses. Rather than viewing what counts as
dIscnmmatIOn m terms of what can be generalized from the nine
J
grounds enu~eratedwithin section 15(1), L'Heureux-Dube J. argued
for an analysis that looks to the impact of the distinction on particu-
\l~ groups. Such an analysis involves three steps: first, demonstra-
Iti~n t?a~ a ~egislative distinction exists; second, demonstration thatthIS distmction results in a denial of one of the four equality rights onth~ basis of the cl~imant'smembership in an identifiable group and,t?Ird, demonstratIOn that this distinction is "discriminatory".74 A dis-
tmction that is discriminatory promotes: "... the view that an individ-
ual adversely a~~cted by this distinction is less capable, or less
worthy of recognItIOn or value as a human being or as a member of
Canadian society, equally deserving of concern respect and consid-
eration.,,75 ' ,
73 Id., at 500. (Emphasis in original.)
7< Egan, supra, note 57, at 552.
7. Id., at 553.
Justice L'Heureux-Dube suggested that a "subjective\ objective"
perspective be used in making the assessment of discrimination.
This requires that the nature of the group adversely affected must be
considered as well as the nature of the interest adversely affected.
By considering the nature of the group adversely affected, one is
able, L'Heureux-Dube J. stated, to comprehend why action against)
one group will attract constitutional attention while identical action
against another group will not. More vulnerable groups will be more
likely to experience adverse treatment as discrimination:
... the more socially vulnerable the affected group and the more funda-
mental to our popular conception of "personhood" the characteristic
which forms the basis for discrimination, the more likely that this distinc-
tion will be discriminatory.76
In such a manner, L'Heureux-DuM J. provided as a focus for her I
analysis the individual situated within a broad social context. This I
understanding enabled her to explain the fact that different treat-
ment of the sexes did not amount to discrimination in cases such as
Weatherall and Hess.77 What L'Heureux-Dube J. most notably did do \
was reject the view that discrimination can be assessed absent con- \
sideration of the claimant's larger social and political environment. .
Also, by leaving assessment of relevancy or appropriateness to the
section 1 argument, Justice L'Heureux-Dube aptly avoided the ste-
rility of argument which plagues Gonthier J.'s test and the compla-
cency of assumption which characterizes McLachlin J.'s analysis.
What emerges then from this new line of equality cases are three
distinctive approaches to analysis under section 15(1). Yet, eight out ofI
the nine judges marked a turn away from the contextual individual of
earlier equality jurisprudence to the more abstract individual of for-
mal equality. Equality becomes simply a protected space for individualI
free choice and action, guaranteed by the law. Discarded by the large
majority of justices is that vision of equality doctrine that views the
equality claimant as necessarily located within a matrix of social,
political, and historical group experiences. In addition, majoritarian
attitudes and practices which are often experienced as exclusionary by
members of marginalized groups are rendered not only legitimate by
the circular logic of legislative relevance, but also, in some instances,
constitutionally sacred by the rhetoric of fundamental values.
?S Id., at 555.
7? Id., at 553-54 (discussing Weatherall, [19931 2 S.C.R. 872 and R. u. Hess,
(1990] 2 S.C.R. 906.
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Iv. THE CHARTER AND POSITIVE RIGHTS
A re~iew of Canadian constitutional rights and freedoms reveals
ve~ qUIckly that most provisions would be empty shells if they were
not Interpreted as placing a mix of negative and positive obligations
on. the .state. 'lb name but a few of the more obvious illustrations of
thIS po~t, denom~ational sC~lOol. rights, language rights, aboriginal
~rea~y nghts, the rIght to a faIr tnal and the right to vote mean noth-
Ing If the state is not obliged to undertake some acts and to refrain
from ?thers. The ri~ht. to. vo~e, for example, can be denied equally
effec~I~ely by .state IntimIdatIOn at polling booths or by simply not
provIdmg ~ollmg booths. We should avoid the half-truths of positive
and negatIve labels, and recognize that the ideals'that rights and
freedoms reach for can be fulfilled best by a combination of positive
and negative state acts.
~ow.ever,whether particular Charter provisions place any positive
obligatIons on the state is a question that continues to haunt Cana-
dian ~onstitutional law. A number of judgments released this Term
dealt ~n:Plicitlyor ex~licitly.with the question of the appropriate mix
of posItIve and negatIve entItlements to be read into the open-ended
lan~age of the Charter. Cases dealing with participation in consti-
tutIOnal negotiations (Native Women's Assn. ofCanada78), the right to
state-funded duty counsel on arrest or detention (Prosper79 Mathe-
s?n80), the ~xtension of old age spousal benefits (Egan81): and the
rIght to an mterpreter in a criminal trial tIran82) all raised a similar
g~neral issu~: does the Charter right or freedom at issue guarantee
sImply negatIve freedom, that is, the right to be free from state' inter-
fer~nce with individual freedoms, or does the Charter also impose
pOSItive obligations on the state to extend benefits or to create the
conditions necessary for the meaningful exercise of rights and free-
doms by all citizens?
A purely negative defmition of rights and freedoms would ensure
that ~he Charter benefits only those individuals with the means to
exerCIse ~d e~orce their rights. Such a conception of rights is
closely allIed WIth the abstrac~ individual of classical liberal theory,
for the pretence of guaranteemg fundamental rights and freedoms
78 Native Womens Association o(Canada v. Canada, (1994] 3 S.C.R. 627.
79 R. v. Prosper, [19941 3 S.C.R. 236.
80 R. v. Matheson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 328.
8. [19951 2 S.C.R. 513.
8' R. v. Tran, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 951.
equally to all can only be maintained if the individual circumstances
and context that may effectively hinder or block access to those
rights are repressed or ignored. Incorporating positive state obliga-
tions into various Charter rights, on the other hand, entails some
recognition of the connection between freedom and equality of condi-
tion in order to put Charter rights within the grasp of Canadians of
all classes. Thus, a positive conception of rights is closely allied with
the contextualized individual of pluralist liberal thought; a consider-
ation of the linguistic, cultural, economic and other differences that
mark individuals in society reveals the inadequacies of a purely neg-
ative conception of rights.
Consistent with the resurgence of abstract individualism in the
Court's equality decisions described in the last section, a number of
the Court's decisions this Term demonstrated a marked unwilling-
ness to interpret Charter rights or freedoms as imposing positive
obligations on government. In the Native Women's Association of
Canada case (NWAC),83 the Court was invited to explore the degree
to which the Charter imposes obligations on government to provide
funding to groups to facilitate a measure of equal participation in
constitutional reform discussions. NWAC was excluded from direct
funding and participation in the talks that ultimately produced the
ill-fated Charlottetown Accord in 1992..Four other national aborigi-
nal organizations did have seats at the table, and their participation
was directly funded by the governinent. NWAC was concerned that
these organizations were inadequately sensitive to sex equality
issues in aboriginal communities. In particular, NWAC was more
committed than the other organizations to the view that aboriginal
women's interests would be better protected if the Charter applied to
the exercise of power by aboriginal governments. At the Supreme
Court, NWAC sought a declaration that it should have been accorded
equal funding and a right to participate in the constitutional talks
on the same terms as the four recipient groups.
NWAC's claim placed in issue the positive dimension of freedom of
expression. This issue was also raised last Term in the Haig case
where L'Heureux-Dube J. observed that "[t]he traditional view ... is
that the freedom of expression contained in s. 2(b) prohibits gags,
but does not compel the distribution of megaphones."s4 Justice
L'Heureux-DuM went on to leave the door open to claims of positive
83 Supra, note 78.
B< Haig v. Canada, (1993) 2 S.C.R. 995 at 1035.
102 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7(2d):81 1996] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 103
freedom by saying that "in the proper context" positive government
a~tion might be required to create conditions favourable to expres-
SIon or to ensure access to information.85 However, as noted in last
year's review, the reasoning and result in Haig (rejecting the claim
on the broad grounds that a matter of legislative policy was impli-
cated) make it "hard to imagine what a 'proper context' for a court
requiring the government to take positive action" might be.86
In NWAC, the Supreme Court closed the door even further on the
possibility of imposing positive obligations on government to facili-
tate equal access to political expression and participation. The Court
was unanimous in rejecting NWAC's claim. Justice Sopinka, who
wrote the principal judgment for seven members of the Court was of
the view that only in "rare,,870r "extreme,,88 circumstances win posi-
tive governmental action be required to make freedom of expression
meaningful. He suggested that such circumstances would' arise
where the government funds organizations in a discriminatory fash-
ion that has the effect of suppressing another group's freedom of
speech.89 Thus, positive government action, it appears, will be
required only when it is necessary to remedy government-imposed
negative restraints on speech. In other words, if you have not been
gagged by the state, do not come to court looking for a megaphone.
NWAC's claim failed, in Sopinka J.'s view, because NWAC was not
deprived of an opportunity to express its views to government90 and
the evidence did not establish that the funded organizations advo-
cated a male-dominated form ofself-government.91
.. Id., at 1039.
8. (1995), 6 S.C.L.R. (2d) at 100.
87 NWAC, supra, note 78, at 657.
88 Id., at 664.
89 Id., at 655-57, Such claims, Sopinka J. stated, were preferably dealt with
under s. 15. Id., at 664.
90 Id., at 662.
91 Id., at 661. McLachlin and L'Heureux-DuM JJ. wrote short concurring judg-
~ents. McLachlin J. took an even narrower view of the government's positive obliga-
tIons under the Charter. In her view, governments are not subject to the Charter
when choosing and funding advisors on policy matters: id., at 668. L'Heureux-Dulle J.
did not agree with what she saw as Sopinka J.'s narrowing of the principles she had
set out'in Haig, supra, note 84. Nevertheless, she agreed that NWAC's freedom of
expression was not violated because it "was not prevented from expressing its views":
td., at 667. For further discussion of the judgments in NWAC, see Trakman "The
Demise of Positive Liberty? Native Womens Association ofCanada v. Canada" (1995)
6 Constitutional Forum 71. '
In sum, the NWAC case supports the dominant liberal view that
governments are entitled to take a laissez faire attitude to the mar-
ketplace of ideas, even if this means that those with access to the
means of communication have the capacity to drown out those who
do not. Governments are also free to shape the marketplace of ideas
by funding the expression of certain viewpoints, and when they do
so, they face no constitutional requirement to facilitate expression of
opposing viewpoints by marginalized groups, like aboriginal women,
unless it can be said that state actions have had the effect of sup-
pressing their point of view. Given that NWAC has been one of the
strongest proponents of the optimistic view that the exercise of judi-
cial power under the Charter will promote women's equality, it is
more than a little ironic that members of the Court gave so little
weight to the value of aboriginal women's equal access to political
participation.
The Court took a similarly narrow approach to the question of
positive rights in Prosper92 and Matheson,93 two cases dealing with
the admissibility of breathalyzer evidence on impaired driving
charges that arose in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island respec-
tively. Both cases raised the question of whether the state has an
obligation to provide free legal advice to individuals upon arrest or
detention. Unlike the other eight provinces, Nova Scotia and P.E1.
did not make available duty counsel after hours to provide free legal
advice to detainees. As a result, the right to counsel was illusory for
those unable to afford a lawyer after hours in those provinces. Nev-
ertheless, eight members of the Supreme Court concluded that the
right to counsel in section lO(b) of the Charter was not breached if
the state fails to provide free legal advice to indigent detainees.
Chief Justice Lamer, who expressed the views of five members of the
Court on this point in Prosper,94 gave a number of reasons for depriv-
ing the poor of a constitutional guarantee of counsel on arrest or
detention. First, he noted that section 10(b) does not expressly
impose a positive obligation on government to provide free and
immediate legal advice.95 Second, he stated that it would be "impru-
dent" for the Court to fail to place weight on the fact that an amend-
92 Supra, note 79.
93 Supra, note 80.
9. Sopinka, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. joined the Chief Justice's reasons, and Major
J., though he dissented regarding the result, expressed his agreement with Lamer
C.J.'s understanding of the right to counsel in s, 10(b).
96 Prosper, supra, note 79, at 266.
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ment to section 10Cb) that would have set out such a positive
obligation was rejected by the Special Joint Committee on the Con-
stitution in 1981.96 A decade before his judgment in Prosper, Lamer
J. Cas he then was) had suggested in the Motor Vehicle Reference that
"care must be taken to ensure that historical materials, such as the
Minutes of Proceedings of the Special Joint Committee, do hot stunt.
[the Charter's) growth".97 The Chief Justice of the Prosper case bears
little resemblance to the judge who joined Wilson J. and Dickson G.J.
in leading the way on the Court's adventures in liberal interpretation
of the 1980s, In light of the text and legislative history of section 10
ofthe Charter, Lamer C.J. said: .
... it would be a very big step for this Court to interpret the Charter in a
manner which imposes a positive constitutional obligation on govern-
ments, The fact that such an obligation would almost certainly interfere
with governments' allocation of limited resources by requiring. them to
spend public funds on the provision of a service is, I might add, a further
consideration which weighs against this interpretation.98
In addition to fiscal prudence, Lamer C.J. cited the "far-reaching"
practical consequences of holding governments to such an obligation
as a reason for not doing so: "the logical implication", he said, "would
be that all arrests and detentions are prima facie unconstitutional"
where a duty counsel system is not in existence.99
While Lamer C.J. was not willing to require governments to pro-
vide access to state-funded duty counsel, he was willing to encour-
age them to do so. Police officers have an obligation to "hold off'
from attempting to gather evidence until a detainee has had a "rea-
sonable opportunity" to contact counsel. In the absence of duty
counsel, Lamer C.J. said that the holding off period may have to be
extended to enable detainees to attempt to locate counsel. 1OO Thus,
provinces that do not provide duty counsel may pay a price in lost
opportunities to gather evidence. Indeed, this is precisely what hap-
pened in Prosper, as a 5:4 majority of the Court concluded that the
breathalyzer evidence should be excluded because the police had
not held off long enough to afford Prosper a reasonable opportunity
to contact counsel.
9' Id., at 267.
97 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 509.
98 Prosper, supra, note 79, at 267.
99 Id., at 268.
100 Id., at 269-70.
Justice L'Heureux-Dube, writing for three members of the Court
on the section 10(b) issue/ol took issue even with Lamer C.J.'s mod-
est encouragement. of state-funded duty counsel. In her view, the
holding off period should not be affected by the presence or absence
of duty counsel. Otherwise, she agreed with Lamer C.J. that there is
no obligation on the state to provide access to duty counseL Like the
Chief Justice, she stated that whether the poor would be able to
exercise the constitutional right to counsel set out in section 10Cb)
was a matter oflegislative policy:
The proper allocation of state resources is a matter for the legislature. In .
its choice of measures, given limited resources, a legislature may prefer
to fund victims of crime rather than accused persons or vice versa - or
may wish to reduce rather than increase Legal Aid funding. 102
Justice McLachlin was left alone in expressing the view that
"[tlhe poor are not constitutional castaways." For her, "the Charter
right to counsel cannot be denied to some Canadian citizens merely
because their financial situation prevents them from being able to
afford legal assistance."lo3 She rebuked her colleagues for justifying
systematic breaches of the right to counsel "on the basis that it is too
difficult or too expensive to provide the means by which the right
may be exercised".I04 In her judgment, section 10Cb) is breached
whenever a detainee is deprived of access to counsel for financial (or
any other) reasons.
The theme' of fiscal prudence that was invoked by the Court to
relieve the state of an obligation to' provide the means to exercise free-
dom of expression and the right to counsel in NWAC and Prosper sur-
faced again in Sopinka J.'s decisive swing judgment in Egan. I05 A 5:4
majority in Egan concluded that the Old Age Security Act's exclusion
of same-sex couples from entitlement to spousal allowances amounted
to a discriminatory denial of the equal benefit of the law. Having found
a section 15 violation, the focus of these judges then shifted to whether
the government could justify the discrimination under section 1 and, if
not, whether the constitutional violation should be remedied by order-
ing government to extend benefits to same-sex couples.
101 Gonthier and La Forest JJ. wrote short separate judgments concurring with
her views on s. 10(b).
102 Supra, note 79, at 288.
103 Id., at 302.
104 Id., at 305.
105 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513.
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The equality rights in section 15 of the Charter are not burdened
as strongly with the label of negative rights as are, say, the funda-
mental freedoms in section 2. Canadian courts understand section 15
as prohibiting governments from actively discriminating and also
imposing some obligations on governments to undertake positive acts
to remedy discrimination. The scope of governments' positive obliga-
tions under section 15 will be determined in large measure by the'
Court's attitude to governments' section 1 burden of justification
with respect to under-inclusive or otherwise inadequate benefit
schemes (and by its willingness to remedy such defects by compelling
governments to extend benefits10B).
In keeping with the Court's narrow approach to positive rights in
NWAC and Prosper, the judgment of Sopinka J. took an extraordinar-
ily lax approach to the section 1 standard of justification in this con-
text. In his view,
... the government must be accorded some flexibility in extending social
benefits and does not have to be pro-active in recognizing new social rela-
tionships. It is not realistic for the Court to assume that there are unlim-
ited funds to address the needs of all.107
He noted that entitlement to a spousal allowance had
expanded over the years, and he suggested that this incremental
approach would some day lead to the inclusion of benefits for
same-sex couples. lOB He concluded that Parli.ament's inaction to
date did not disentitle it from relying on section 1, since discrim-
ination against same-sex couples "is still generally regarded as a
novel concept". 109
Justice Sopinka was the one member of the section 15 majority
who found that the violation of equality rights in this case could be
upheld under section 1. Justice La Forest, writing for the other four
members ofthe majority in the result, did not need to address section
1 having found no violation of section 15. Nevertheless, he stated in
obiter dicta that, had he concluded that there was a section 15 viola-
tion, he would have upheld the legislation under section 1 "for the
considerations set forth in my reasons in McKinney ... as well as for
those mentioned in my discussion of discrimination in the present
case."no The passages in McKinneylll he referred to express the same
lOS On this issue, see Schachter u. R., [1992) 2 S.C.R. 679.
107 Supra, note 105, at 572.
108 Id., at 575.
109 Id., at 576.
lIO Id., at 540.
general themes of deference to legislative incrementalism, fiscal con-
straints and balancing of competing interests relied on by Sopinka J ..
The swing judgment of Sopinka J. is cavalier in its disregard of
the government's burden of proof under section 1 and the stages of
analysis set out in the Oakes1l2 test. As Iacobucci J. pointed out,
the criteria of "novelty" and "incrementalism" introduced by
Sopinka J. permit "s. 1 to be used in an undulydeferential manner
well beyond anything found in the prior jurisprudence of this
Court" .113 Missing is the Court's usual insistence that governments
provide evidence that demonstrates the need to violate Charter
rights in order to achieve other objectives. The McKinney case,
dealing with mandatory retirement, was previously the high-
water mark of judicial deference under section 1. In that case,
there was a plausible argument that governments should be given
reasonable leeway when they have made bona fide attempts to bal-
ance the equality rights of elderly workers against the interests of
younger workers and employers. However, it is disingenuous to
suggest in Egan, as La Forest and Sopinka JJ. did by citing
McKinney, that the government had decided to exclude same-sex
couples after considering their needs and balancing the costs of
their inclusion against competing claims. In fact, a review of the
legislative and committee debates on the spousal allowance since
its introduction in 1975 reveals no mention of the needs of same-
sex couples whatsoever.
The highly deferential approach taken to the issue ofjustification
by the section 1 majority in Egan gives lower courts, if they are so
inclined, the freedom to absolve governments of any meaningful
standard of justification for discriminatory social benefit schemes.
This result will have the effect of further discouraging already risky
and costly litigation that seeks to employ section 15 to impose obliga-
tions on government to extend social programmes to the benefit of
disadvantaged groupS.1I4
While the positive rights claims in Egan, Prosper and NWAC
encountered an unreceptive Court, the justices' approach to the posi-
tive rights dimension of the Charter was not uniformly unfavourable
J1J McKinney u. University ofGuelph, [1990) 3 S.C.R. 229 at 316-18.
112 R. u. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
113 Supra, note 105, at 619.
114 See Duclos and Roach, "Constitutional Remedies as 'Constitutional Hints': A
Comment on R. u. Schachter" (1991),36 McGill L.J. 1.
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this Term. In Tran 115 the Court took a broad and sensitive approach
to the state's positive obligation to provide interpreters to accused
persons in criminal trials. The Tran case afforded the Court its first
opportunity to interpret the scope of the right to the assistance of an
interpreter set out in section 14 of the Charter. Chief Justice Lamer,
on behalf of a unanimous Court, wrote an opinion that, in its clarity ,
and commitment to large, liberal principles of interpretation, reads
like a mid-1980s Dickson Court judgment.
The Chief Justice began by noting that the common law had not
always been supportive of an accused's need for the assistance of an
interpreter. In fact, Canadian courts early in this century tended to
reject a positive conception of the right to an interpreter for the very
same reasons invoked by the current Court to reject positive concep-
tions of rights in the cases discussed above, namely, fiscal prudence
and impracticality.11s
The common law has since evolved to the position that an
accused in a criminal trial with an inadequate grasp of the lan-
guage of the proceedings has a right to a state-funded inter-
preter. 117 Chief Justice Lamer summarized the current state of the
law as follows:
... a person facing criminal charges who does not speak or understand the
court's language has the right under the common law to be provided with
an interpreter. The right to interpreter assistance is a means of ensuring
that proceedings are fair and comply with the basic principles of natural
justice.118
The right must be recognized "even where this causes inconvenience
or takes up additional time".119
The issue in Tran was the adequacy and continuity of the interpre-
tation provided to the accused at trial. The funding of interpreters
was not at issue, and Lamer C.J. took care to avoid any reference to
the issue. However, he appeared to take for granted that all aspects
of the common law right now have constitutional status. Moreover,
116 [19941 2 S.C,R. 951.
116 See, e.g., R. v. Meceklette (1909), 15 C.C.C. 17 at 19; R. v, Sylvester (1912), 19
C.C.C. 302 at 306-07.
117 The leading case is R. v. Lee Kun, [1916] 1 K.B. 337 (C.A.). See Steele, "Court
Interpreters in Canadian Criminal Law" (1992), 34 C.L.Q. 218 for a review of the case
law.
118 'Iran, supra, note 115, at 967.
l19 Id., at 966.
the generous tone of his judgment suggests that there is little risk
that the Charter will be interpreted to permit the denial of an inter-
preter at trial to an indigent accused. Throughout, and in sharp con-
trast to his judgment in Prosper regarding the right to counsel on
arrest or detention, Lamer C.J. assumed without discussion that sec-
tion 14 of the Charter imposes positive obligations on government.
He summarized the scope of the constitutional right to an inter-
preter as follows:
The constitutionally guaranteed standard of interpretation is not one
of perfection; however, it is one of continuity, precision, impartiality,
competency and contemporaneousness. An accused who does not
understand and/or speak the language of the proceedings, be it
English or French, has the right at every point in the proceedings in
which the case is being advanced to receive interpretation which
meets this basic standard. 120
How are we to understand the Court's untroubled, even wel-
coming, adoption of a positive rights conception of section 14 in
light of the anxiety and resistance that greeted the positive
claims made under sections 2(b), 10(b) and 15 in NWAC, Prosper
and Egan respectively? One obvious lesson to draw is that despite
the Court's assertion in Dagenais that there is no hierarchy of
Charter rights,121 it does appear that some rights are more posi-
tive than others. While all rights are fulfilled ideally by a mix of
positive and negative state obligations, the Court's commitment
to this ideal wavers. One reason for this may be that the notion of
Charter rights and freedoms equally available to all, and the
mythic abstract individual on which it relies, is serviceable in
some contexts and demonstrably false in others. The guarantee of
negative freedoms without the positive means of exercising them
is not likely to be countenanced where it would produce highly
visible absurdities or injustices. As Lamer C.J. commented in
Tran, an interpreter is necessary to ensure that "no person should
be subject to a Kafkaesque trial which may result in loss of lib-
erty.,,122 In short, the myth of the abstract individual may support
purely negative conceptions of rights in the marketplace of ideas,
upon arrest or detention, or in the distribution of economic
120 Id., at 998.
121 Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Dagenais, [1994]3 S.C.R. 835 at 877.
122 'Iran, supra, note 115, at 975.
V. THE FAMILY
resources, but it cannot withstand the harsh glare of the criminal
trial process. l23
123 Indeed, in Prosper, [1994) 3 S.C.R 236, both Lamer C.J. (at 266, 274) and
L'Heureux-DuM J. (at 288) were careful to make clear that they may well take a dif-
ferent approach to the state's duty to provide counsel where the right to a fair trial is
at stake. When it is given the opportunity, the Court will likely affirm the Ontario
Court of Appeal's position that the state has a constitutional duty (under ss. 7 and
lI(d) of the Charter) to provide counsel to an indigent accused whenever legal repre-
sentation is necessary to a fair trial: see R. u. Rowbotham (1988), 41 C.C.C. (3d) 1. For
more on the right to state-funded counsel, see Schneiderman and Graydon, "An
Appeal to Justice: Publicly Funded Appeals andR. u. Robinson; R. u. Dolejs" (1990), 28
Alta. L. Rev. 873 and Moon, "The Constitutional Right to State-Funded Counsel on
Appeal" (1989), 14 Queen's L.J. 171.
IU [1995] 2 S.C.R 513.
125 [1995) 2 S.C.R 627.
While the shift to the conceptualization of the bearer of Charter
rights as liberalism's unencumbered individual is clear in the equal-
ity cases discussed in Part III, and implicit in the positive rights
cases just discussed, it becomes considerably less straightforward in
the cases we will examine in the next two sections. The currency of
discourse is still abstract individualism, but the Court signals
through its framing of the issues and their resolutions a more tex-
tured set of assumptions about what is, in its eyes, really at stake.
The results reveal a constellation of assumptions about proper social
and moral ordering accompanying an understanding of the individ-
ual as self-determined and freely choosing. Created is one of the
more distinctive confluences of imagery in recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence.
Nowhere is this pairing of abstract individualism and moral con-
servatism more marked than in those cases that deal with family
issues. 1b illustrate this, we look at Eganl24 and Thibaudeau,l26 both
cases where equality claims about the distribution of resources,
either within or to families, were at issue. In these cases, the claim-
ants, members of specific and disadvantaged groups, were unable to
access equality rights because of the Court's failure to recognize the
value and distinctiveness of the family form in which the claimants
found themselves. Also, while a majority of the Court was quick to
assert initially the values of individual autonomy, choice, and equal-
ity, these values remain only formally guaranteed when the claim-
111CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
'26 Income Tax Act, RS.C. 1970-71·72, c. 63, ss. 56(1)(b) and 60(b).
127 Supra, note 125, at 692. (Emphasis in original.)
.28 Id., at 695.
129 Id., at 702.
130 For a discussion of the practical and economic consequences of the inclusion!
deduction scheme, Bee Philipps and Young, "Sex, Tax, and the Charter: A Review of
Thibaudeau u. Canada" (1995), 2 Review of Constitutional Studies 221, at 270·300.
ants' choices undermine or threaten mainstream assumptions about
family structure and roles.
Thibaudeau provides the starkest example of the sacrifice ofindi-
viduality in favour of traditional patriarchal familial ordering. At
issue was the Income Tax Act requirement that child support pay-
ments received by a custodial parent be taxed in the hands of the
recipient, while payor parents are granted a tax deduction (the
"inclusion/deduction scheme").I26 Suzanne Thibaudeau challenged as
contrary to section 15(1) of the Charter the statutory requirement
that child maintenance payments be included in the custodial par-
ents' income. The five majority judges were united by their finding
that the legislative scheme imposed no burden on custodial parents.
Justices UHeureux-Dube and McLachlin wrote separate dissents,
both finding an unjustifiable infringement of section 15(1).
The majority judgments are most remarkable for their finding
that the Income Thx Act provisions do not even trigger section 15
protections. That the judges failed to identify Thibaudeau's case as
raising any equality problems, even initially, is astonishing. It illus-
trates that hard lesson: constitutional doctrine can always be
finessed by judicial ideology (here familial and gender ideology). It
did not matter that the majority judgments were animated by
diverse understandings of discrimination. The justices' refusal to
disaggregate divorced or separated women from their former
spouses, to peer within the family unit - even the post-divorce fam-
ily "unit" - and look to individual equality, meant that any equality
analysis was doomed. For Gonthier J., it was enough that the "tax
burden on the couple is reduced"'27 and that therefore the "impugned
system provides an overall benefit to couples supporting children".128
Justices Cory and Iacobucci similarly insisted that "the divorced par-
ents still function as a unit". "If anything", they wrote, "the legisla-
tion in question confers a benefit on the post-divorce 'family unit'."I29
The fact that in practice the scheme automatically benefits payors,
and frequently (as in Thibaudeau's situation) makes recipients
worse Off,13O was not addressed by the majority, as the distribution of
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the benefit between the members of the "couple" was considered to be
irrelevant. In other words, whether or not the inclusion/deduction
scheme is implicated in the well-documented gendered disparity in
wealth following divorce was a question the majority considered to be
outside the scope of Charter equality concerns.
Not surprisingly, the two women on the Court were sharply criti-
cal of the majority's approach and its consequences. As McLachlin J.
put it: "Where unequal treatment of one individual as compared with
another is established, it is no answer to the inequality to say that a
social unit of which the individual is a member has, viewed globally,
been fairly treated."l3l
The majority's assertion of family solidarity, .even in the face of
divorce and separation, appears to challenge the primacy of the
"autonomous freely choosing individual" as rights bearer. However,
from another perspective, it simply reinforces this ideal, as ulti-
mately the Court, because it cannot find this autonomous individual
in these cases, found no breach of the Charter. Had the Court been
more sensitive to the notion of "individual in context" (a competing
image), perhaps Suzanne Thibaudeau would have emerged as a.
rights holder. Comprehending Ms. Thibaudeau's circumstances
demands an appreciation ofhow her economic status is both separate
from and still connected to that of her ex-husband. It involves an
appreciation of how such circumstances raise issues unique to
women in their roles as primary caregivers to their children.
This case, ironically, reminds us of the revolutionary impact of lib-
eral individuality on status relations: without it, women are ren-
dered invisible within the family unit - however such a unit is
conceived. Here, conflation of a woman's economic circumstances
with those of the nearest man ensures that women are granted no
economic individuality. This perpetrates both a simplistic patriarchal
picture of the world and a blindness to the ways individuality neces-
sarily occurs in a complex social reality. Thus, the majority decisions
in Thibaudeau combine a conservative and sexist picture of family
relations with a rigid refusal to recognize individuality as it is con-
toured by social and legal associations. Given the overwhelming gen-
dered nature of the impact of the tax provisions under challenge,132
the practical consequences of these postures in Thibaudeau repre-
sent a significant setback for women's citizenship struggles, at both
131 Supra, note 125, at 716. L'Heureux-Dulle J. made the same point, id., at 644.
13' See generally Philipps and Young, supra, note 130.
the symbolic and material levels.
From a more doctrinal perspective, the Court's manipulation of
stakeholders in this case - moving from individual men and women
to family units encompassing both of the separated parents - illus-
trates the tremendous flexibility with respect to group identification
that equality theory inevitably grants. As a comparative concept,
equality demands that units of comparison be established.133 Such a
process is unavoidably indeterminate and therefore subject to an
infusion of judicial biases. It can operate either to locate or diminish
the claimant's statement of harm. In Miron, L'Heureux-Dube J. rec-
ognized the sensitivity of this aspect of an equality inquiry when she
noted that "uncritical comparison of dissimilar groups can under-
mine the purposes of s. 15 of the Charter rather than further
them".134 In Thibaudeau there is a double manipulation of this
notion of group membership: Suzanne Thibaudeau becomes repre-
sentative not of a group of individuals but of a group of groups
(divorced families). This again illustrates the Court's use of a partic-
ular status relation to render irrelevant the Charter's protections of
autonomous individuality.
Similar assumptions about proper familial ordering and the
manipulation of comparator groups can be observed in the Court's
consideration of state allocation of economic benefits between vari-
ous kinds of families in Egan and Miron. The fundamental point of
contention in these two cases was whether section 15 of the Charter
prohibits the state from continuing to legislate a three-tiered hierar-
chy of intimate relationships, with married spouses favoured over
unmarried heterosexual spouses and both favoured over gay or les-
bian spouses. As discussed above, a 5:4 majority rejected Egan's and
Nesbit's challenge to the exclusion of gay and lesbian couples from
entitlement to spousal allowances under the Old Age Security Act. In
Miron, on the other hand, a 5:4 majority held that the Ontario gov-
ernment had discriminated against unmarried heterosexual couples
by denying them accident benefits in standard automobile insurance
contracts which married couples could claim.
The Court held for the first time in these two cases that sexual
133 In Andrews, 119891 1 S.C.R. 143 at 164 McIntyre J. stated: "[Elquality is a
comparative concept, the condition ofwhich may only be attained or discerned by com-
parison with the condition of others in the social and political setting in which the
question arises." For a discussion of this point, see Philipps and Young, supra, note
130, at 261-70.
134 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, at 467.
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orientation and marital status are grounds of discrimination anal-
ogous to those enumerated in section 15. Despite this holding, the
four judges making up a minority on the section 15 issue, led by
Gonthier and La Forest JJ., defended the status quo from the chal-
lenge of anti-discrimination law. They stated that "Parliament may
quite properly give special support to the institution of m'arriage"
because of "the biological and social realities that heterosexual
couples have the unique ability to procreate".135 In their view, the
laws at issue that denied benefits to either same-sex couples
(Egan) or all unmarried couples (Miron) were not discriminatory
since the exclusions were relevant to the state's goal of supporting
marriage.
The other five judges rejected the circular reasoning of their col-
leagues. In their view, laws that favour a category of spouse defined
by reference to marital status or sexual orientation are discrimina-
tory. Justice McLachlin wrote in Miron that the state must respect "a
matter of defining importance to individuals", namely, "the individ-
ual's freedom to live life with the mate of one's choice in the fashion of
one's choice".136 Justice Cory in Egan noted that the exclusion of
same-sex couples from benefits reserved for spouses "reinforces the
stereotype that homosexuals cannot and do not form lasting, caring,
mutually supportive relationships with economic interdependence in
the same manner as heterosexual couples".137 It followed, in
Iacobucci J.'s words, that "differential treatment between married
and common law spouses is constitutionally suspect" as is "differen-
tial treatment of relationships based on sexual orientation".138 In the
result, five judges were willing to use section 15 of the Charter to
broaden the legal definition of spouse to include common law couples
in Miron and four judges reached the same result for same-sex cou-
ples in Egan.
Ai'> discussed in Part IV above, Sopinka J. broke ranks with his lib-
eral colleagues in Egan at the second stage of Charter analysis,
namely, the question of whether the government's violation of Egan's
equality rights could be justified as a reasonable limit pursuant to
section 1. In Miron, on the other hand, Sopinka J. agreed with
McLachlin J.'s conclusion on the section 1 analysis that marital sta-
tus was not a "reasonably relevant marker" of who should be entitled
136 Egan, supra, note 124, at 536 per La Forest J.I'. Miron, supra, note 134, at 497.
181 Egan, supra, note 124, at 604.
IS8 ld" at 610-11,
to automobile accident benefits.139 Justice Sopinka was thus willing
to demand that legislatures broaden legislative definitions of family
to include unmarried couples so long as they were heterosexual.
Most of the legal differences between married and unmarried het-
erosexual couples have been erased by legislative reforms over the
course of the last 25 years. However, some important differences
remain. 140 For example, property rights in provincial family law leg-
islation can be invoked only by marriage partners. The reasoning in
Miron suggests that Charter challenges to these remaining legal dif-
ferences may succeed, perhaps ultimately obliterating any legal dis-
tinctions between marriage and "living in sin".
In contrast, the differences in the current legal treatment of same-
sex couples and heterosexual couples are legion. With few excep-
tions, Canadian legislatures have chosen not to recognize gay or les-
bian relationships. When confronted with the broad agenda of law
reform potentially provoked by the encounter between section 15
and the legislative status quo, Sopinka J. balked. The government,
he said, "does not have to be pro-active in recognizing new social
relationships".141 Thus, not only is it no longer necessary to be a
member of a marginalized group to benefit from section 15's protec-
tion, but, if a group is too marginalized, its members may have diffi-
culty benefiting from section 15 at all.
The immediate impact ofEgan has been to shift Charter claims by
same-sex spouses from the section 15 frying pan to the section 1 fire.
The majority judgments on section 15 provide strong support for the
view that a wide range oflaws or practices that disadvantage lesbian
and gay couples relative to their heterosexual counterparts will be
found to be discriminatory. However, the reasoning of the section 1
majority in Egan has virtually ensured that we will continue to wit-
ness the spectacle of courts and legislatures passing the law reform
buck to each other in the coming years. The burden of law reform
remains where it has been, namely, on lesbian and gay litigants.
Their success in one area seems assured in light of the 5:4 major-
ity that found the spousal definition at issue in Egan to be discrimi-
natory: human rights tribunals in most jurisdictions will likely issue
rulings making clear that it is illegal to deprive gay and lesbian
139 Miron, supra, note 134, at 507.
140 See Cossman and Ryder, Gay, Lesbian and Unmarried Heterosexual Couples
and the Family Law Act: Accommodating a Diversity ofFamily Forms (Ontario Law
Reform Commission, 1993).
1<1 Egan, supra, note 124, at 572.
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employees ofemployment benefits that can be claimed by their hetero-
sexual colleagues.142 A growing number ofpublic and private employers
now extend benefits to same-sex couples. Recalcitrant employers will
find that, in most jurisdictions, the Egan case will effectively force them
to do so since, with the exception of Nova Scotia, a section I-like escape
hatch is not available to parties seeking to justify discrimination that is
challenged under human rights legislation.143
On the other hand, the success of Charter challenges by gay or les-
bian couples to discriminatory legislation is likely to be halting and
unpredictable as some judges are likely to follow, and others to dis-
tinguish, the unprincipled approach Sopinka J. took to section 1 in
Egan. l44 This result reminds us of the theme highlighted in last
year's review, namely, the justices' "desire not to step outside the
boundaries of what they perceive to be the 'social consensus' or'dom-
inant views' in Canadian society".145 Perhaps what Sopinka J. is
14' See Vogel v. Manitoba, (1995) M.J. No. 235 (Man. C.A.). Chris Vogel had been
seeking legal recognition of his gay relationship for over 20 years with no success until
this ruling. The Manitoba Court of Appeal overturned an adjudicator's dismissal of
Vogel's most recent human rights complaint. Phelp J.A., despite his obvious sympa-
thies with the views of La Forest J., wrote that, following Egan, "this Court is bound to
conclude that the denial of spousal benefits under Mr. Vogel's employment benefit
plans to his same-sex partner is the result of their sexual orientation, and is, there-
fore, discriminatory treatment under the Code."
"3 The Nova Scotia Human Rights Act, RS,N.S. 1989, c. 214, has a saving provi-
sion that reproduces the exact language of s. 1 of the Charter: s. 6(1)(;;). The laws in
Alberta and the Yukon contain "reasonable limit" exceptions to the prohibitions on dis-
crimination: Individual's Rights Protection Act, RS.A. 1980, c. A-16, s. 11.1 ("reason-
able and justifiable in the circumstances"); Human Rights Act, S.Y. 1987, c. 11, s. 9(d)
("reasonable cause"), In Alberta, whether a complaint can be brought at all depends
on whether a court ruling reading in "sexual orientation" as a prohibited ground ofdis-
crimination is affirmed on appeal: see Vriend v. Alberta (1994), 152 A.R 1 (Q.B.). The
Manitoba Human Rights Code, S.M. 1987·88, c. H175, ss. 13(1),14(6),15(1), excuses
some kinds of discrimination if "bona fide and reasonable cause" can be established. In
all other jurisdictions, there is nothing approaching a 5.1 equivalent.
144 See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Canada, 11995] O.J. No. 2531 (Ont.Gen.Div.), a Charter
challenge to s. 252(4) of the Income Tax Act. This section prevents the registration of a
pension plan for the purposes of obtaining a tax deferral on contributions if the plan
extends spousal survivor benefits to same-sex couples. After finding a violation of s.
15, rather than asking whether the government had discharged its burden of proof
under the various stages of the Oakes test, Charron J. characterized the issue as
whether "the case at bar can be distinguished from the decision in Egan and Nesbit."
In her view, it could not because there was "no meaningful distinction" between "the
denial of a direct cash outlay by way of benefit as opposed to the benefit in question in
this case, the tax deferral which flows from the registration of a pension plan".
us Bakan et al., "Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1993-94 Thrm"
(1995), 6 S.C.L.R (2d) 67 at 68.
really saying is that there is not yet a sufficient public consen-
sus on the full recognition of gay and lesbian rights, particularly
when it comes to expanding legislative definitions of family, and
for the Court to lead the way into a new era would be to risk too
great an assault on the fragile legitimacy of judicial review. Yet,
a selective refusal to assume the full mantle oflegislative review
itself threatens the legitimacy of the process. This is particu-
larly so if the Court's courage falters exactly when called upon
by the vulnerable minorities whose protection from majoritarian
neglect arguably justifies this exercise of judicial power in the
first place.
Justice Sopinka's last-minute denial of protection to gay and les-
bian couples echoes similar ideological feints in the majority deci-
sions in Thibaudeau and the minority reasons in Miron. Abstract
individualism - with its prioritizing and protection of individual
choice and freedom - becomes less sacrosanct when such individu-
alism runs counter to cherished notions offamilial ordering. Individ-
ual freedom then becomes tempered by the restraints ofconservative
ideals of social structuring. .
VI. PARENTAL LIBER~ RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY
AND MEDICAL EXPERTISE
In this next section, we continue to explore the linkage of
abstract individualism with conservative assumptions about
proper moral orderings and choice - here, religious ones. In
B. (R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto,146 the
individual of the equality cases emerges dominant yet again, but
at the same time the choices such an individual makes or the free-
dom such an individual might enjoy are very much shaped by
dominant religious ideals. Thus, we are presented again with the
peculiar convergence of a formally neutral and abstract vision of
the individual, denatured of any social or political context, and
the application of Charter protections so as to enshrine only a
very selective vision of the religious good life.
The B.(R.) case brought together a number ofthe elements which
make up the increasingly focused neo-conservatism of the Court's
jurisprudence. B.(R.) concerned Jehovah's Witness parents, Beena
and Richard B., whose infant child, Sheena B., was apprehended
146 [1995] 1 S.C.R 315.
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when they refused to consent to a blood transfusion recommended by
a physician. At the initial hearing, the presiding judge accepted med-
ical evidence that Sheena B. might require a transfusion on short
notice to treat congestive heart failure and granted a 72-hour ward-
ship order to the Ontario Children's Aid Society (CAS.). At a subse-
quent hearing, the order was extended for 21 days. At this second
hearing, C.A.S. witnesses testified that Sheena B. was still at risk
from congestive heart failure and, additionally, was in need of explor-
atory surgery for possible infant glaucoma. Sheena B. received a
blood transfusion two days later in the course of exploratory surgery.
A few weeks later, wardship was terminated and Sheena B. was
returned to her parents.
The parents framed their objections to the apprehension in terms
of two constitutional arguments. The first was that section 7 liberty
extends to parental liberty and their rights in this regard had been
violated in a manner inconsistent with the principles of fundamental
justice. They pointed to two violations of fundamental justice: the
failure of C.A.S. to disclose that it had obtained a medical opinion on
the day of the first hearing which rejected the diagnosis of a conges-
tive heart condition, and the failure of CAB. to give notice of the
infant glaucoma argument advanced at the second hearing. The sec-
ond constitutional argument made by the parents was based on the
protection of freedom of religion in section 2(a) of the Charter. Again,
the parents' main concerns related to the process by which the
authorities determined the legality of the apprehension. The B.'s
argued that section 1 of the Charter requires a very high standard of
medical necessity before parents' religious objections to medical
treatment for their infant children can be set aside. Indeed, the par-
ents argued that where medical opinion is divided, the Court should
defer to the parents' wishes. The Court was unanimous in dismissing
both the section 2(a) and section 7 challenges to the legislative
scheme.
1. Section 7, Parental Liberty and the Individual
The Court used the B.(R.) case to explore the key issue ofthe scope
of section 7 liberty and of the fundamental freedoms in section 2.
This is significant as section 7 has been given very little consider-
ation outside the penal and criminal context. Thus the question of
whether liberty means more than simply the physical liberty of the
individual has never been addressed fully except by Wilson J. In pre-
vious cases, Wilson J., writing alone, had extended section 7 liberty
to concerns about the rights of parents to determine the upbringing
of their children147 and the rights of women to make reproductive
decisions. 148 In B.(R.), Lamer C.J. argued that section 7 liberty is
limited to "the physical dimension of the word 'liberty' which can be
lost through the operation of the legal system."149 The Chief Justice
made it clear that his interpretation would, for the most part, limit
section 7 to challenges to the criminal and penal justice system.150
However, Lamer C.J.'s reasons 'garnered no explicit support.
Although Sopinka J. found it unnecessary to decide whether a lib-
erty interest waS engaged,151 and Iacobucci, Major and Cory JJ. also
preferred to leave the issue for another day, 152 the remaining four
members of the Court were willing to extend section 7 liberty rights
to interests other than physical liberty and, in particular, to "the
right to nurture a child, to care for its development, and to make
decisions for it in fundamental matters such as medical care".153
The Court also split on the second issue pertaining to the scope of
section 7, namely, whether the liberty of the individual should be
considered in isolation from or in the context of other individuals
who have conflicting constitutional claims. In B.(R.), the question
took the form of whether the B.'s parental rights should be qualified
by their child Sheena's section 7 rights to life and security ofthe per-
son. Neither Lamer C.J. nor Sopinka J. expressed views on this
issue. Justice La Forest espoused the "isolated" view for a plurality
offour judges while Iacobucci and Major JJ. (with whom Cory J. con-
curred) wrote reasons in favour of the "contextual" view. When the
issue was addressed with respect to section 2(a), La Forest J.'s "iso-
lated" view obtained the agreement of Sopinka J. to form a majority
of five while Iacobucci and Major JJ.'s "contextual" view obtained the
agreement of Lamer C.J. to constitute, with Cory J., a minority of
four.
Underlying the Court's uncertainty over whether to analyze a
rights claim in isolation or in the context of other possibly conflicting
147 R. lJ. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 294.
14. R. lJ. Morgentaler, [19881 1 S.C.R. 30.
14. Supra, note 146, at 34l.
I~Old.
161 ld., at 428.
162 ld., at 431, 434.
163 ld., at 370 per La Forest J. (Gonthier and McLachlin JJ. concurring). L'Heu-
reux-Dube J. wrote a separate judgment concurring with La Forest J. on the substan-
tive issues: id., at 392.
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constitutional rights claims lies a fundamental disagreement over
the nature ofthe individual holder of Charter rights. Justice La For-
est's "isolated" view portrays the individual in a fashion associated
with classical liberalism, namely, as an abstract agent whose happi-
ness consists of the unimpeded pursuit of subjectively defined prefer-
ences. The constitutionally protected freedoms and liberties accorded
this individual, therefore,.must be at least presumptively unqualified
by any consideration for the relational dimension of individual self-
hood, even when the text of the Constitution itself would seem to
demand acknowledgement of a more complex and interconnected
social landscape. This construction of the individual has already
become the norm in the freedom of expression cases. In B.(R.), La
Forest J. extended this analytic approach to the delineation of sec-
tion 7 liberty and to section 2(a) freedom of religion. In doing so, he
clearly identified the political vision which inspires what might oth-
erwise seem an arid distinction. He wrote firmly and vigorously of
the "fundamental importance of choice and autonomy in our soci-
ety",154 and asserted thatthe interest protected by section 7 liberty in
the B.(R.) case is not a right to family integrity but an individual
right of the parent which inheres in the broader value of individual
privacy. He then sketched out a notion of privacy which cast it solely
in terms of the opposition between the private sphere of individual
freedom and the public sphere of state intervention.
The more contextualized portrait of the individual advanced in the
reasons of Iacobucci and Major JJ. places the individual alongside
other rights holders. While this is by no means a radical departure
from liberal individualism, it at least acknowledges that persons lead
their lives within a social setting. It allows the possibility of provid-
ing a more textured account of rights in terms of harmful impacts on
the constitutional rights of other individuals. Thus, at a minimum,
parental liberty can be given a meaning that incorporates the obvi-
ously relational nature of parenting rather than casting children as
potentially hostile interests which might provide, either reasonably
or unreasonably, a basis for the state to constrain parenting choices.
It is interesting to compare the split over the "isolated" versus
"contextual" view in B. (R.) with the analysis of section 7 in Rodriguez
v. British Columbia (Attorney General).155 In the latter case, the
majority reasons by Sopinka J. asserted that an individual's claim to
'6< ld., at 372.
166 119931 3 S.C.R. 519.
section 7 liberty and security of the person "cannot be divorced from
the sanctity oflife, which is one ofthe three Charter values protected
by section 7".156 This would seem to contradict the view espoused by
La Forest J. in B.(R.). However, in Rodriguez, the conflict is not
between the individual claimant and other rights holders but
between different dimensions of the individual's own constitutional
status as a full member of the political community. The majority in
Rodriguez was willing to try to make a coherent whole out of the
array of constitutional claims available to the individual, or, at least,
out of those available in relation to the three values presented as a
single protection in section 7. The isolated individual remains at the
centre of the analysis. By way of contrast, the approach of Iacobucci
and Major JJ. in B. (R.) strives to make a coherent whole out of the
array of claims available to the individual in relation to other indi-
viduals with equally important but possibly conflicting claims. The
extent to which La Forest J.'s "isolated" view of the individual in
B.(R.) appears to contradict at least the spirit of Sopinka J.'s major-
ity reasons in Rodriguez perhaps explains Sopinka J.'s perplexing
silence on the issue in B.(R.).
2. Section 2(a) and Religious Community
As noted earlier, the same debate over an "isolated" versus "con-
textual" approach to defining rights arises with respect to freedom of
religion. The plurality support for La Forest J.'s "isolated" view
became the majority with the addition of Sopinka J. This is consis-
tent with previous cases on the ambit of both freedom ofreligion and
freedom of expression. Indeed, the Court's analysis of the fundamen-
tal freedoms has always been firmly grounded in the view that rights
protect negatively described spheres of individual autonomy and
expression. Any resolution of the tension between this abstract nega-
tive understanding of individual freedom and the constitutional
interests of other individuals or groups has been relegated to section
1 of the Charter. The majority in B.(R.) adhered to this pattern by
finding that the constitutionally protected parental freedom to con-
trol the religious education of children is presumptively uncon-
strained by the health and well being ofthose children.
By shifting any account of the particular social and historical
meanings of religious freedom to the section 1 stage of analysis, the
150 ld., at 584.
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importance of nurturing diverse religious communities in a complex,
multifaceted and pluralist society is, ironically, diminished and
demeaned rather than given pride of place as a fundamental value.
The consequence of the focus on the reasonableness of the state's
interference with individual freedom is that the B.'s and others who,
for religious reasons, deviate from mainstream norms of appropriate
child rearing are inevitably portrayed as unreasonable, as parents
who would selfishly insist that their own choices and desires prevail
over the health and survival of their children. In the dramatic strug-
gle between the wilful rights holding individual and the potentially
overbearing state, there is no structured opportunity for the B.'s to
present an account of how, in fact, their particular religious or cul-
tural community provides for the well being of its children. Disap-
peared are the specific contours of the communities within which
individuals live, worship, pray and care for their children.
As Shauna Van Praagh has noted, religious communities function
as quasi-publics within liberalism's traditional private sphere.157 Van
Praagh characterizes religious communities as "self-perceived, small
normative universes coexisting with the larger normative structure
of the state".158 She points out that often communities' "authoritative
structures ... address many details of internal family life, and the
law's commitment to certain policies with respect to the family may
be experienced as an attack on the self defined jurisdiction of those
communities".159 Thus, a rigidly binary account of politics prevents
the development of a framework which can meaningfully accommo-
date cultural and religious differences. .
The now orthodox structure of analysis under section 2 of the
Charter, with its emphasis on the section 1 justification for state
interference in negatively drawn spheres of freedom, also erases
the specific dimensions of children's experiences of religious com-
munity from consideration. Van Praagh is careful to identify both
the positive and negative potential of children's relations to reli-
gious authority and the way in which the subsuming of children's
complex and unique interests within those of the parents distorts
and limits the creative and remedial potential of law. 160 In B.(R.),
157 See Van Praagh, "The Youngest Members: Harm to Children and the Role of
Religious Communities" in Fineman (ed.), The Public Nature of Private Violence: The
Discovery ofDomestic Abuse (1994), at 149.
158 Id., at 152.
.., Id.
160 Id., at 164.
this latter phenomenon is starkly evident in La Forest J.'s dis-
missal of the notion that Sheena B. has any religious interests at
stake on the grounds that "a child must be old enough to entertain
some religious beliefs in order to do SO"161 and in the paucity of the
remedial options considered by the decision makers, namely, either
to place Sheena B. under the care and control of the state or to
leave her under the care and control of her parents. In sum, in
B.(R.) religious beliefs are constructed as individually expressed
preferences in an open market of differently packaged spiritual
practices. While this preserves the appearance ofliberal tolerance,
it does not bode well for the larger project of creating a jurispru-
dence which addresses rather than avoids issues of cultural conflict
in a pluralist society.
3. Fundamental Justice and Reasonable Limits: Legal Scrutiny of
Medical Expertise and Authority
As discussed above, the Court casts the B.(R.) case primarily in
terms of the "big" issue of state intervention in the private sphere
of individual familial and religious choices. On those simplistic
terms, it is an easy case. As La Forest J. noted, even the parents
agreed that, in general, the state should intervene to protect chil-
dren. 162 However, as Martha Minow has noted, by focusing on
whether the state should intervene, courts, commentators and
policy makers sidestep the more complex and difficult issue of
how the state should intervene.163 This is a particularly salient
observation in B. (R.) for it is the "how" of state intervention which
is the core of the parents' claim. In particular, the B.'s are critical
of the power wielded by medical and health care professionals in
determining the legality of the apprehension. .The focus of this
aspect of the parents' complaint is the legislative definition of a
child in need of protection which provides the legal basis for an
apprehension. The definition states, in part, that a child is in
need of protection
... where the person in whose charge the child is neglects or refuses to
provide or obtain proper medical, surgical or other recognized remedial
care or treatment necessary for the child's health or well-being, or refuses
161 Supra, note 146, at 38l.
162 Id., at 375.
163 Minow, "Beyond State Intervention in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe" (1984/
85),18 U. Mich. J. Law Ref. 933, at 953.
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to permit such care or treatment to be supplied to the child when it is rec-
ommended by a legally qualified practitioner ...164
In the course of the litigation leading up to the appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada, the parents argued that the legislative
standard contained in the definition improperly delegates the power
to decide if a child is in need of protection to a doctor rather than a
judge. This claim was rejected by both Whealy Dist. Ct. J., and Tar-
nopolsky J.A. for the majority at the Court of Appeal. Unfortunately,
the underlying issue of the infusion of medical standards into legal
criteria and the extensive reliance of the state on medical expertise
and knowledge was never again fully addressed.
At the Supreme Court of Canada, in order to get at the "how"
issue, in particular the nexus between medical authority and legal
standards, the parents had to fit their claims into the strictures of an
argument based on a breach of fundamental justice or on the state's
failure to reasonably limit rights under section 1. Th a certain extent
this worked well. The parents' complaints regarding the C.A.S.' fail-
ure to disclose contradictory medical evidence and the C.A.S.' failure
to give notice of the infant glaucoma argument are exactly what is
contemplated by the procedural fairness aspect of fundamental jus-
tice in section 7. However, in the face of the parents' argument that
the seriousness of the core value of parental liberty should require
stringent procedural protections and a high standard of medical
necessity combined with a lack of treatment alternatives before an
apprehension is found to conform to fundamental justice principles,
La Forest J. asserted that section 7 simply sets a minimum threshold
of fairness rather than guaranteeing "the most equitable process of
all" .165 In his view, the outline of the process in the legislation pos-
sessed all the earmarks of a procedurally just regime: a standard of
necessity, an adversarial hearing, notice to the parents and review of
the wardship order before expiry. Against the backdrop of urgent cir-
cumstances and overall procedural propriety, La Forest J. agreed
with the lower courts that the less than full disclosure and notice
accorded the parents was minor and of no significance. 166
Justice La Forest's willingness to provide latitude and flexibility
where medical apprehensions are involved seems sensible and prag-
164 Child Welfare Act, RS.O. 1980, c. 66, s. 19(1)(b)(ix); later S.O. 1984, c. 55, s.
37(2); now Child and Family Services Act, RS.a. 1990, c. c.n, s. 37(2).
,.5 Supra, note 146, at 380.
166 Id., at 379-81.
matic, especially given the nature of medical emergencies and the
wide consensus on the "big" issue, namely, that the state should act
rapidly to protect infants endangered by lack of medical care. How-
ever, the submerged issue ofhow the legal standard of "proper medi-
cal, surgical or other recognized remedial care or treatment
necessary for the child's health or well-being"167 should be deter-
mined deserved fuller inquiry. This is not simply a question of the
procedural fairness of the decision-making process or of the formal
distribution of power within that process. Rather, the parents' chal-
lenge interrogated, at least in part, the persuasive and rhetorical
power of the scientific discourse of medical need deployed within the
hospital and courtroom by what the Act calls a "legally qualified
practitioner". Rather than revive the failed argument made in the
earlier stages of the litigation, namely, that the legislation improp-
erly places physicians in the role of judges, the parents resorted to
claiming, as set out above, that their own religious liberties are so
fundamentally important that the steps taken by the state" to "res-
cue" their infant from grave and immediate danger should be held to
extraordinarily strict standards of due process. Given the consensus
that the state should intervene, this stance ultimately leaves the
parents looking preposterously selfish and untrustworthy. Thus the
underlying issues regarding the nature of expertise and the subtle
linkages between disciplinary authority and state coercion are easily
ignored.
Roughly the same pattern repeated itselfin the context ofthe sec-
tion 2(a) religious freedom argument. Although La Forest J. noted
that in his view the parents had experienced a serious rather than
trivial violation of their rights to religious freedom/68 he dealt only
briefly and somewhat dismissively with the parents' section 1 sub-
missions.
The parents again argued that, in light of the religious freedoms
at stake, the state failed to meet the legislative standard of necessity
in apprehending their daughter and, therefore, the apprehension
was not a reasonable limit. Justice La Forest at first expressed
impatience with this gambit, stating that:
This argument fails to distinguish between the demonstration of the
necessity of the treatment, as contemplated in the Act, and the demon-
stration of the reasonable nature of the legislative scheme, under s. 1 of
167 Child Welfare Act, supra, note 164.
168 [1995J 1 S.C.R 315 at 385.
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the Charter. For the reasons already stated, one must take for granted the
necessity ofthe medical treatment and thUS, the need for protection under
the Act.169
Justice La Forest's reference to "reasons already stated" for not
questioning the necessity of medical treatment is to his earlier obser-
vation that the courts below gave full consideration to the often con-
flicting medical evidence regarding Sheena B.'s condition. 170
However, the parents were not challenging the assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses but rather the way in which the legal
standard makes the credibility of medical professionals the pivotal
issue. Instead, the parents submitted that where the evidence is con-
flicting and uncertain, more weight should be given to the parental
assessment of what is best for their child. In a sense, they were ask-
ing that, in special circumstances, parents be given the same author-
ity on medical issues as medical professionals. Justice La Forest's
insistence that the only issue is one of deferrin.g to findings of fact in
the courts below, effectively cut short any discussion of the legal
standard and its appropriateness in the B.'s situation. Later, in the
course of setting out the disposition of the case, La Forest J. perhaps
expressed some discomfort with the way he structured the debate in
the following passage:
The concern voiced by the appellants in the present appeal raises the
more general question of the appropriateness of proceeding with treat-
ments for which the medical benefits are highly questionable, when
parental refusal is in part only grounded on religious beliefs. However, the
medical evidence presented in 1983, as well as that presented before
Whealy Dist. Ct. J., does not permit us to question the necessity of the
blood transfusion, although some might in retrospect be tempted to do
so.171
While there is no easy answer to the problem of the amount of
authority wielded by a wide range of experts within the administra-
tive state, the consistent refusal to acknowledge the issue prevents
the development of even the most rudimentary analysis of this com-
plex intersection of private and public power. Instead, medical
authority remains intractably private and beyond scrutiny, even
when it is deliberately invoked in the extremely public and coercive
process of a child apprehension.
169 [d.
17. [d., at 361-62.
I7l [d., at 390.
Among all the decisions handed down this Term, the R.(B.) case
provides perhaps the clearest example of how the entrenched indi-
vidualism of the classical liberal vision of political relations serves to
reinforce rather than challenge existing institutional and social rela-
tions. The judgments contain some of the strongest expressions of
the Court's growing tendency to cast Charter issues in terms of the
free, self-directed, and socially isolated individual versus the repres-
sive state. At the same time, the B.'s, who sought to use the classical
account of the meaning of individual rights to express their concerns
as parents and as members of a subordinated religious community,
were defeated at almost every juncture. The norms of reasonable-
ness invoked to justify the rejection of the B.'s claim consistently pre-
sented dominant values as objective truths and the practices of
established institutions as politically neutral technical expertise.
Thus the result in the case appeared inevitable and sensible without
compromising the central value of individual liberty. However, to the
extent that complexities were simplified, diverse conceptions of com-
munity rendered invisible, and deeply held values dismissed as fool-
hardy or irrational, the R. (R.) decision represents a defeat for all
members of the Canadian polity in terms of the impoverishment of
our political discourse.
VII. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, THE PRESS AND
OTHER MEDIA OF COMMUNICATION
The individual subject of constitutional law comes starkly into
view in this Term's freedom of expression cases. Here the abstract
individual is made more complete by the Court's con~eption of the
institutions of state and civil society which shape the lives of the
individual Charter claimants. Both cases we discuss also concern the
Charter's influence on the development of common law limitations
on freedom of expression. We defer to Part VIII our discussion of the
application issue and the Court's reinscribing of the public/private
divide.
One of the key problems facing any theory of freedom of expres-
sion is to reconcile its underlying premises with the cultural and
political practices of western democracies. Public deliberation
amongst self-governing citizens occurs not in the classical liberal
sens~, between individuals, but interstitially, through powerful
medIators. 172 This manifests itself in two ways. First, communication
conglomerates exercise this mediating function amongst citizens via
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an outpouring of news, information, and entertainment, one often
indistinguishable from the other. Second, new information technolo-
gies enable what has been called "computer-mediated communica-
tion".173 Through the application of computer technology, individuals
are connecting with groups of people through computer bulletin
boards and networks overcoming the constraints of both time and
place. In both ways, communication is becoming a global phenome-
non and the old rules no longer seem to apply or have any relevance.
In Canada, and increasingly around the globe; the startling reality
is that media ownership is highly concentrated; in the English-Cana-
dian newspaper industry, for example, ownership is concentrated
largely in the hands of only two business concerns. 174 With deregula-
tion, transnational media conglomerates are now seeking to control
all aspects of media distribution, from film and television production
to videos and music. This drive toward vertical and horizontal inte-
gration means that the most powerful media outlets will now be con-
centrated in the hands of a few. 175
This close relationship between popular media and private power
is exacerbated by the commercial necessity of advertising space. 176
While patrons, readers, and advertisers always have played an
important role in the financial life of the press, concerns are now
heightened by the growing concentration of power and the close
nexus between ownership and editorial control. If contributing to
rational political deliberation has been one of the primary objec-
tives of the media - an objective given constitutional recognition in
section 2(b) - it has been skewed by the marketplace concerns of
the media. In Habermas' terms, the media have become the gate
m Garnham, "The Media and the Public Sphere" in Calhoun (ed.), Habermas
and the Public Sphere (1992), at 360 and see Glasbeek, "Comment: Entrenchment
of Freedom of Speech of the Press - Fettering of Freedom of Speech of the People"
in Anisman and Linden (eds.), The Media, The Courts, and the Charter (1986), at
100.
113 Rheingold, "A Slice of Life in My Virtual Community" in Harasim (ed.), Global
Networks: Computers and International Communication (1993).
174 Thomson Newspapers and Southam Inc. together share 47.6 per cent of the
English-Canadian newspaper market as of September 1994. See Hackett, Pinet and
Ruggles, "News for Whom? Hegemony and Monopoly Versus Democracy in Canadian
Media", in Holmes and Taras (eds.), Seeing Ourselves: Media, Power and Policy in
Canada, 2nd ed. (1996), at 257-72.
17' McNish, "Merger Mania Starring Michael Eisner and Gerald Levin" The Globe
& Mail (September 2, 1995), at Bl. On the media merger "frenzy," see Barber, Jihad
vs. McWorld (1995), Chapter 9.
176 Hollingsworth, The Press and Political Dissent (1986).
,\
through which privileged private interests have invaded the public
sphere. 177
Almost in tandem with growing media concentration is the prolif-
eration of new technologies which tend toward a corresponding devo-
lution in power. These new forms of communication enable more
people to communicate more information to more places than ever
before. Paradoxically, this is a phenomenon not entirely unconnected
to the first, namely, the growing concentration of media power.178
Much of this new technology is being delivered by private industry
- the on-line information service "Prodigy," for example, is co-owned
by IBM and Sears while the hardware and software is owned by
some top Fortune 500 companies. Although culturally specific to
affluent societies with access to expensive computers and modems,
computer-mediated communication is being made widely available
in the western democracies and the far east at relatively low mainte-
nance cost. According to sophisticated users of this technology more
information means more "freedom" and a radically decentralized glo-
bal marketplace of information activity.179 Where access to comput-
ers is available, these technologies render international borders
irrelevant and regulation by nation-states difficult, ifnot impossible.
The Supreme Court of Canada has wrestled on occasion with the
tension between the promise of self-government fostered by freedom
of expression and the limitations on deliberative practices posed by
the concentration of media power. On the one hand, the Court has
described the "fundamental importance [of freedom of expression] to
a democratic society",180 and that the media, "by gathering and dis-
seminating news, enablers] members of our society to make an
informed assessment of the issues which may significantly affect
their lives and well-being".J8lJ'he media have been described approv-
ingly by the Court as "surrogates for the public"182 and as "agent of
177 Habennas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry
Into a Category ofBourgeois Society, trans. T. Burger (1992), at 185.
178 See Stallabrass, '"Empowering Technology: The Exploration of Cyberspace"
(1995), 211 New Left Review 3.
179 See Sterling, The Hacker Crackdown: Law and Disorder on the Electronic
Frontier (1992) at 61.
180 Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [19891 2 S.C.R. 1326 at 1336
per Cory J. for the majority.
181 Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1991] 3
S.C.R. 459 at 475 per Cory J. for the Court.
182 Edmonton Journal, supra, note 180, at 1359-60 per Wilson J. (quoting Chief
Justice Burger of the United States Supreme Court).
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the public in monitoring and reporting on governmental, legal and
social institutions".183 On the other hand, the Court has recognized,
as noted in last year's review, that freedom of expression in practice
often means freedom only for those who have the financial capacity
to express themselves, that is, that "speech often takes place under
conditions of scarcity".I84 "Only those with enough wealth to own.
land, or mass media facilities (whose ownership is largely concen-
trated)" are able to engage in freedom of expression.185
This Term, in Hill v. Church ofScientowgy ofTbronto,t86 the Court
preferred to maintain the status quo in the law of defamation, and
this appeared to be the preferred outcome, in part, by reason of the
influential power of the media in public discourse. 187 Also this Term,
in Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Dagenais,l86 the Court has sig-
nalled that computer-mediated communication provides an impor-
tant contextual component for freedom of expression jurisprudence,
particularly in the case of court-ordered publication bans. That con-
text, however, was entirely ignored in Hill despite its pertinence to
the developing law of defamation. 189
One explanation for the Court's contrasting approach to the
impact of new information technologies is, perhaps, that classical lib-
eral understandings were implicated in the Hill case, and had a
lesser role to play in Dagenais. Thus, thinking about individuals in
the classical liberal sense, as having the proverbial fence of privacy
erected around them, helps us to understand the different results in
these two cases. In the context of a criminal trial (as in Dagenais),
las Canadian Broadcasting Corp. u. Lessard, 119911 3 S.C.R. 421 at 451. .
'" Haig u. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995 at 1037 per L'Heureux-DuM J. for the
majority. See discussion in Bakan, Ryder, Schneiderman and Young, "Developments in
Constitutional Law: The 1993-94 Term" (1995), 6 S.C.L.R. (2d) 67 at 98-102.
185 Committee for the Commonwealth ofCanada v. Canada, [1991)1 S.C.R. 139 at
198 per L'Heureux-DuM J.
186 (1995) 2 S.C.R. 1130.
181 For a more explicit articulation of this rationale, see Lepofsky, "Making Sense
of the Libel Chill Debate: Do Libel Laws 'Chill' the Exercise of Freedom of Expression"
(1994),4 N.J.C.L. 169 and Martin, "Does Libel Have a 'Chilling Effect' in Canada?" in
Martin and Adam (OOs.), A Sourcebook ofCanadian Media Law (1991), at 757.
18. \19941 3 S.C.R. 835.
189 See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) and the
discussion in Branscomb, "Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to
the First Amendment in Cyberspace" (1995), 104 Yale L.J. 1639. Even Sopinka J.
acknowledged this fact in his address at the University ofWaterloo symposium on free
speech and privacy: "Freedom of Speech and Privacy in the Information Age" (Novem-
ber 26, 1994) available at gopher:/linsight.mcmaster.ca:70/00/0rglefcldoclsfsplsopinka.
the accused is presumed to have lost those rights of dignity and pri-
vacy which attach to him or her in private civil society. Having been
implicated in the criminal process, individual rights are circum-
scribed and the protection of reputation lost to the exigencies of the
open court. Yet, in the usual case of a suit for defamation (the Hill
situation), the individual is presumed not to have lost the semblance
of privacy and regard for reputation which attaches to the individ-
ual. Reputation here is likened to property rights, an important com-
ponent of individual autonomy. IIi libel law, falsity and malice are
presumed, and a damage award analogized to the "taking" (a prop-
erty law conceptYof a person's reputation, requiring compulsory com-
pensation. loo It is this ideological construct,and the threat posed to .
it by new information technologies, which may help to better explain'
the differences in these two cases.
1. Publication Bans
Publication bans of pending or ongoing court proceedings have
proven to be an important target in Charter litigation, but assertion of
speech interests have not been entirely successful in this regard. In
Alberta, for example, the Court of Queen's Bench ordered the cessa-
tion of the play "lIsa, Queen of the Nazi Love Camp", a "musical com-
edy" which parodied hate promoter James Keegstra, mid-way through
its Edmonton run. The play was staged during Keegstra's second trial
in Red Deer some 150 kilometres away. The Alberta Court of Appeal
affirmed the trial judge's overly cautious approach, concluding that
freedom of expression interests would be minimally impaired if stag-
ing of the play was delayed until after the trial. This was despite the
fact that Keegstra's re-trial was a matter of some public interest and
that a small Calgary theatre company and its Edmonton sponsor
would incur significant financial losses if the play was banned.191 .
Perhaps the most notorious issuance of a publication ban and its
fall-out concerned the trial and sentencing of Karla Homolka. The
press were not permitted to report on any of the evidence presented
before the Court until such time as that evidence had been intro-
duced at the trial of her co-accused Paul Bernardo.192 This fuelled
190 Sunstein. Democracy and the Problem ofFree Speech (1993), at 47.
191 See Edmonton Journal (March 6, 1992) at B3; Edmonton Sun (March 8, 1992).
at 21.
192 R. u. Bernardo, [19931 O.J. No. 2047 (Ont. Div. Ct.); affd 95 C.C.C. (3d) 437 (Ont.
CAl.
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community outrage over her plea bargain of 12 years' imprisonment
for her role as accomplice in the deaths of two teenaged girls. One
resident of St. Catharines went so far as to distribute leaflets con-
taining banned information about the grisly torture and murders
door-to-door in contravention of the court order. 193 The controversy
also made clear that court-ordered publication bans, as well as many
other forms of government regulation concerning speech, were futile
enforcement measures as information about the trial could be
obtained via broadcast sources in the United States, print sources
overseas, as well as by the spread of new information technologies,
such as Internet. 194 It was this context which helped to prompt the
Supreme Court in Dagenais to issue guidelines concerning the use of
publication bans in criminal trial proceedings.
The dispute in Dagenais arose during the trial of four members of
the Catholic religious order, the Christian Brothers. All five men
were standing trial, or had commenced their trials, on charges of
having physically and sexually abused young boys under their
charge at a residential school in Ontario. Similar charges had been
laid against Christian Brothers at Mount Cashel in Newfoundland.
The disclosure of the sexual abuse at Mount Cashel was a highly
publicized event, leading to the uncovering of similar events in loca-
tions all over the country. With the laying of charges, victims of sex-
ual abuse at residential schools were emboldened to come forward in
Ontario and elsewhere. The events at Mount Cashel provided the
foundation for the fictionalized account, "The Boys of St. Vincent~', a
National Film Board of Canada production. The mini-series was
scheduled to be broadcast nation-wide over the Canadian Broadcast-
ing Corporation and a local Montreal station which broadcast into
Eastern Ontario.
The accused successfully sought an order before the Ontario Court
of Justice restraining the broadcast of the film and any advertise-
ment relating to its broadcast until such time as the four trials were
completed. The presiding judge also went so far as to seal the Court
record concerning the application until the completion of the trials.
The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the order, but unsealed the
record and modified the ban so that it applied only to the Province of
Ontario and the Montreal station. Chief Justice Dubin for the
193 "Defied Homolka Ban, Man Fined $4,000" The Globe & Mail (July 1994), at
A6.
•9< "Bureaucrats can access Thale details" The Calgary'Herald (January 6,1994)
dM. '
Ontario Court of Appeal characterized the dispute as a conflict
between two express Charter values: freedom of expression and the
right to a fair trial. In the event of such a conflict, the former free-
dom was to give way to the latter right. The guarantee of expression
could still be exercised to its fullest at a later date, while the right to.
a fair trial would be impaired irreparably ifexpression rights were to
have priority.
A majority of the Supreme Court rejected a "hierarchy-of-rights"
approach, allowed the appeal and reversed the decision ordering the
publication ban.195 In so doing, the Court designated the process for
t~e appeal of publication bans ordered by superior court judges
dIrectly to the Supreme Court, issued guidelines for courts making
publication ban orders, and, lastly, modified the third branch of the
proportionality test in Oakes. Of concern here are the latter two rul-
ings, although the extraordinary process available to third parties to
appeal interlocutory orders in the context of criminal trials directly
to the Supreme Court of Canada should not escape notice. All of the
judges of the Court noted the present inadequate state of the law as
concerns third party challenges to publication ban orders and called
upon Parliament to provide a clear remedial path for appeal. 1OO
According to the majority judgment of Chief Justice Lamer, the
common law rules regarding publication bans preferred the right to
a fair trial over freedom of expression. In the era of the Charter even
as applied to the common law, "a hierarchical approach to rights ...
~ust be avoided" and a balance "achieved that fully respects the
Importance of both sets of rights".197 The majority opinion also
eschewed the conflict model offree press versus fair trial which they
associated with the American model of free speech. Fair trial inter-
ests are sometimes impeded and, on other occasions, promoted by
open access to court proceedings, and the Court catalogued some of
these potential effects in its judgment.198
The majority opinion also reflected upon the efficacy of publica-
tion bans as a prophylactic to media influence on the trial process.
195 Lamer C.J. wrote the principal judgment (Sopinka, Cory, Iacobucci and Major
,JJ. concurring) for the majority. McLachlin J. wrote a separate concurring opinion.
La Forest and L'Heureux-Dulle JJ. wrote separate dissents, both finding the Court
had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Gonthier J. also dissented, upholding the pub.
lication ban as it applied to the two accused who had yet to be tried.
19. Dagenais, supra, note 188, per Lamer C.J. at 858; per UHeureux-Dube J. at
917; per McLachlin J. at 947-48; per La Forest J. at 894.
197 [d., at 877.
198 [d., at 882-83 per Lamer C.J.; see also La ForestJ. at 894.
134 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7(2d):81 1996] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 135
Juries may not be so easily influenced by news reports and, even if
they are, they are likely capable of following the judge's instructions
to ignore all information presented to them outside of the court pro-
ceedings.199 Moreover, the Court admitted, new information technolo-
gies have made court-ordered publication bans even less efficacious:
"In this global electronic age, meaningfully restricting the flow of
information is becoming increasingly difficult. Therefore, the actual
effect of bans on jury impartiality is substantially diminishing."2°O
This observation throws into question the efficacy of all content-
based state regulation of expression, regulations which the Court
approved in its decisions in Keegstra, Butler, and the Prostitution
Reference.201
Taking into account these factors, the Court articulated a test,
fashioned after that in Oakes,202 for the issuance of publication bans
under the common law or legislated discretionary authority. Accord-
ing to the Court, a publication ban should be ordered when:
(a) Such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk
to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative mea-
sures will not prevent the risk; and
(b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious
effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban.203
Applied to the case, the initial order of Gotlib J. would not have
passed even the first stage of the test. Not only was the ban over
broad, applying as it did to the whole of the country and prohibiting
even reports of the ban itself, other less restrictive alternative mea-
sures were available. These included adjourning trials, changing
venues, sequestering jurors, using jury selection procedures, and
"strong judicial direction" to the jUry.204
The test also suggests a modification of the third step of the sec-
ond branch of the Oakes' proportionality test. According to Oakes,
the state need only show in the third and last step that the impor-
tance of the objective outweighs the deleterious effects of the chal-
lenged measure. This usually is easily proved, having determined,
"9 Id., at 884-85.
200 Id., at 886 and see Sopinka J. supra, note 189.
201 See R. v. Keegstra, [1990) 3 S.C.R. 697; R v. Butler, [1992)1 S.C.R. 452; Refer·
ence re Criminal Code, ss. 193 and 195.J(1)(c), [1990\1 S.C.R. 1123.
202 R. v. Oakes, [1986)1 S.C.R. 103.
203 Dagenais, supra, note 188, at 878. (Emphasis added.)
204 [d., at 881.
in the first step in Oakes, that the objective is sufficiently pressing
and substantial to warrant overriding the Charter rights and free-
doms. As the second branch of the new common law rule suggests,
Lamer C.J. concluded that the test be modified to require that both
"the underlying objective of a measure and the salutary effects that
actually result from its implementation be proportional to the dele-
terious effects the measure has on fundamental rights and free-
doms''.205 Therefore, the objective's importance will not, in and of
itself, save restrictions on Charter rights and freedoms unless the
beneficial effects of the measure also outweigh its negative effects.
The impetus for this change in the last step in Oakes is unclear,
particularly in the context of this case, where failure to meet the
least restrictive alternative requirement was easily proved by the
press. Indeed, the last step has proven, in most every case where it
is applied, to have been largely redundant, most of the work being
done by the second branch of proportionality test - the least
restrictive means test. It seems curious that the Court should see
any need to strengthen this last requirement, other than being
motivated by a concern that the integrity of the whole test is at
stake - if anyone requirement appears to be superfluous, then
other parts of the test become questionable. If this was a motivat-
ing concern, an alternative for the Court would have been to ques-
tion the utility of this part of the test altogether. Yet the likely, and
unmentioned, consequence is that a revised and strengthened last
step will make it more difficult for governments to satisfy the
Oakes burden of proof - a consequence at odds with much of the
post-Oakes section 1 jurisprudence concerned with showing more
deference to legislative choices.
Justices Gonthier and L'Heureux-DuM, in separate judgments.,
expressed strong disagreement with the majority's modification of
the common law criteria for issuing publication bans. Both con-
cluded that the common law status quo adequately protects free
expression interests. Justice Gonthier went so far as to endorse the
decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Keegstra, mentioned
above, as the model of judicial prudence. In the event of two funda-
mental Charter rights coming into conflict, Gonthier J. recom-
mended that the minimal impairment branch of the Oakes test not
be applied too rigorously in order that "minimal impairment of one of
the rights ... [not] theoretically mean maximal impairment of the
205 Id., at 887. (Emphasis in original.)
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other".206 The United States experience was instructive for Gonthier
J., as preferring freedom of expression over fair trial rights has led to
the virtual rejection of prior restraint orders.207 But it is important to
note, which Gonthier J. did not, that the first amendment has not
done away entirely with publication ban orders,2°s nor does the
majority endorse entirely doing away with the exercise of judicial.
discretion.
2. Libel and Slander
The media, publishers, authors, and civil liberties groups long
have been critical of the strict liability approach of the common law
of defamation. It is argued that the common law approach places
rigid limitations on deliberation regarding matters of public concern.
This disquiet is not without foundation. Public figures prominent in
Canadian public life have been prolific plaintiffs in the jurisprudence
of defamation law.209 Then British Columbia Premier Bill Bennett
successfully sued a member of the opposition for suggesting he tip-
pled drink on the job210 while former Minister of Defence, Bob Coates,
succeeded in his libel suit against the Ottawa Citizen for suggesting
that he disclosed state military secrets to patrons in a West German
bar.211 Trial judges, in particular, have exhibited a distinct lack of
humour about political affairs. Bill Van Der Zalm, then Minister of
Human Resources in British Columbia, successfully sued an editorial
cartoonist for depicting him tearing the wings off of flies212 while
political commentator Allan Fotheringham was the subject of a suit
for likening federal Liberal party insiders in B.C. to members of the
Shaughnessy "wife-swapping" set.213 If the Court appeared to be def-
erentialto expression interests in Dagenais, particularly where two
... Id., at 923.
207 Id., at 924. See Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
208 See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
209 See generally the discussion in Klar, "'IfYou Don't Have Anything Good 'Ib Say
About Someone ..... in Schneidennan (ed.), Freedom of Expression and the Charter
(1991), at 261.
210 Bennett v. Stupich (l981), 125 D.L.R. (3d) 743 (B.C.S.C.).
211 Coates v. Citizen (The) (1988), 44 C.C.L.T. 286 (N.S.S.C.).
212 Van Der Zalm v. TImes Publishers (1979), 96 D.L.R. (3d) 172; revd (1980), 109
D.L.R. (3d) 531 (E.C.CA).
213 Hunter v. Fotheringham, [19861 B.C.J. No. 2279 (E.C.S.C.). For a recent exam-
ple of this distinct lack ofjudicial tolerance for open public debate at the appeal level,
see Mitchell v. Nanaimo District 'leachers Assn. (1994),94 E.C.L.R. (2d) 81 (CA).
Charter rights had to be balanced one against the other, one would
have anticipated a significant victory for the· press in a challenge to
the common law of libel where no explicit Charter right was to be
weighed in the balance against expression.
Although not a suit against the media itself, Hill v. Church ofSci-
entology concerned an appeal from the largest jury award for defam-
atory libel in Canadian history. Casey Hill, a Crown Prosecutor in
'!bronto, was awarded $1.10 million dollars for defamatory state-
ments made by the Church of Scientology and their counsel Morris
Manning at a press conference held to publicize contempt proceed-
ings being launched against Hill. Relations between the Church of
Scientology and Hill went as far back as 1977, when the Crown Law
Office began investigating the Church's activities and it, in turn,
began closely monitoring Hill's activities. Hill was labelled "Enemy
Canada", and in the Church's file of that name it was revealed that
the Church had been tracking Hill for four years with a view to "neu-
tralizing" him.214
The particular incidents which gave rise to the libel occurred in
1983, when Hill advised the Ontario Provincial Police regarding the
search of the Church of Scientology's premises and the seizure of
some 250,000 documents, amounting to over 2 million pages of mate-
rial. In a motion to quash the search warrant, in which Hill repre-
sented the Crown, Justice Osler ruled that solicitor-and-client
privilege applied to 232 of the seized documents, and ordered that
they be sealed.
In the interim, and in an unrelated matter, the Church had made
application to the Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations
that its president, Reverend Earl Smith, be authorized to solemnize
marriages. The Deputy Registrar General believed that she could be
assisted in making her decision by reviewing the seized documents. A
lawyer in the Civil Division of the Attorney-General's office contacted
her counterpart Hill in the Criminal Division. Hill advised that access
to the documents could be obtained only with a court order. That order
was obtained by the Civil Division without notice to the Church.
Upon being informed by the Deputy Registrar General that she
had reviewed certain of the documents that had been seized, lawyers
for the Church moved quickly. On the assumption that documents
which had been protected by solicitor-client privilege, either sealed
or mistakenly left unsealed, had been disclosed, disciplinary hear-
214 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 at para. 21.
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ings before the Law Society of Upper Canada and applications for
contempt were threatened. Finally, Morris Manning, appearing in
his barrister's gown on the steps of Osgoode Hall, read from the con-
tempt motion which was to be filed the next day. In it, the Church
charged Hill and Jerome Cooper, a lawyer in the Ministry of Con-
sumer and Commercial Relations, with having permitted access to .
court-ordered sealed documents. The libel was broadcast and
reported widely in southern Ontario.
The jury award of $300,000 in general damages (jointly against
Manning and the Church), and $500,000 in aggravated damages and
$800,000 in punitive damages (against the Church alone) was amply
justified, wrote the Ontario Court of Appeal, on the basis of the evi-
dence before the jury and by the conduct of the Church following the
jury's verdict. The Church held its press conference even when its own
preliminary investigation suggested that the contempt allegations
were unfounded. Mer the verdict, the Church was unrepentant,
repeating the libel in pleadings and argument before the Court of
Appeal.215 The Church, in the words of the Ontario Court of Appeal,
"was engaged in an unceasing and apparently unstoppable campaign
to destroy Casey Hill and his reputation".21S The sums awarded by the
jury were justifiable, the Court concluded, despite the fact that Hill
received four promotions, was elected both a bencher of the law society
and President of the Ontario Crown Attorney's Association.217 He has
since been appointed a Judge ofthe Ontario Court ofJustice.
The main constitutional issue before the Supreme Court of Can-
ada was whether the common law of defamation was consistent with
the Charter's guarantee of freedom of expression. Subsidiary issues
concerned the defence of qualified privilege and the amount of the
damage award. All of the issues were joined by the argumentative
thread that the Canadian law of libel deterred legitimate delibera-
tion on issues of public concern, that is, that libel law had a "chilling
effect" on public discourse.218 On this point, the Court was
'" Hill v. Church ofScientology (1992), 18 O.R. (3d) 385 (CA) at 458-59.
216 Id., at 459.
217 Id., at 439.
218 Empirical studies on the impact of libel law on the press are equivocal. Com·
pare Blasi, "The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study" (1971), 70 Mich. L.R. 229;
Labrunski and Pavlik, "The Legal Environment of Investigative Reporters: A Pilot
Study" (1985), 6 Newspaper Res. J. 13; Barrett, "Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A
Better Alternative" (1986), 74 Cal. L.R. 847 with Bow and Silver, "Effect of Herbert v.
Lando on Small Newspapers and TV Stations" (1984), 61 Journalism Q. 414; Weaver
and Bennett, "Is New York Times 'Actual Malice' Standard Really Necessary? A Com-
parative Perspective" (1993), 53 Louisiana L.R. 1153.
unmoved.219
The Court signalled its ruling on the balance between freedom of
expression and reputation by designating defamatory statements as
being "tenuously related to the core values which underlie s. 2(b)".220
Applying a more "flexible" approach to balancing than is required
under section 1 of the Charter,221 the Court weighed against this "low
value" speech the value of a person's reputation, which has particu-
lar significance for those practising law, for "a lawyer cannot survive
without a good reputation".222
Much of the decision addresses the question whether Canadian
courts should adopt the rule relaxing the strict liability approach of
libel law articulated by the United States Supreme Court in New
York Times v. Sullivan. 223 Freedom of speech in the United States
reached its high-water mark in that case, which concerned the
alleged defamation of a police commissioner in Montgomery, Ala-
bama. As part of a concerted campaign against the civil rights move-
ment and the northern establishment press, Sullivan simply was
one in a series oflibel suits amounting to a claim of almost $300 mil-
lion in damages.224 Perhaps going farther than was necessary on the
facts of the case,225 the U.s. Supreme Court held that the common
law presumptions of falsity and malice, which rendered libel a strict
liability tort, did not sufficiently protect speech interests.Where the
plaintiff is a "public" official, the solution was to place the onus on
the plaintiff to show that the defendants made the statements with
"actual malice", with knowledge or reckless disregard oftheir falsity.
219 The Court has accepted the chilling effect argument in a limited number of
cases. The press arguments concerning chilling effect were accepted in R. v. Zundel,
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (false news provision of the Criminal Code over broad deterring
legitimate expression), while Justice La Forest accepted the media's claim of chill in
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Lessard, [19911 3 S.C.R. 421 (search and seizure of
.media offices). The press argument was rejected in Canadian Newspaper Co. v. Can.
ada (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122 (publication ban on identities of complain-
ants in sexual assault cases upheld as media are competent enough to determine
what material subject to the ban) and Lessard, id.
220 Hill, supra, note 214, at para. 106.
221 Id., at para. 97.
222 Id., at para. 118.
223 376 U.s. 254 (1964).
224 See Kagan, "A Libel Story: Sullivan Then and Now" (1991), Law & Soc. Inq.
17 at 19-20 and Lewis, Make No Law: The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment
(1991), at 36.
22' See Epstein, "Was New York TImes v. Sullivan Wrong?" (1986), 72 Univ. Chi.
Law Rev. 782 at 786·92.
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In the 20 years since the ruling, there have been all variety of criti-
cisms aimed at the actual malice rule. These include such concerns as
the shift away from inquiring into the truth of the allegation to an
inquiry into the defendant's negligence, the social cost in the constitu-
tional protection of falsehood which could have the negative effect of
actually distorting public debate,226 and the difficulty of defining who .
is "public figure" for the purposes ofthe rule.227 Justice Cory recited a
variety of these criticisms as grounds to reject the adoption of the
actual malice rule in Canada.228 Justice Cory also invoked recent Aus-
tralian and English decisions, and Australian and Irish Law Reform
recommendations all of which have shied away from embracing the
New York Times v. Sullivan rule. He saw little problem to democratic
politics posed by the common law rules. Echoing the common law view,
Justice Cory wrote: "Surely it is not requiring too much of individuals
that they ascertain the truth of the allegations they publish."229
A revealing aspect of the decision is the selective nature of the evi-
dence the Court invoked. In response to criticisms of the actual mal-
ice rule, a number of reforms to the American law of libel have been
proposed, such as confining the rule to only political speech conce:n-
ing governmental matters,230 or non-monetary judgements which
focus solely on the truth or falsity of the alleged libe1231 - none of
these are discussed by the Court. The Court's treatment of the recent
Australian decision of Theophanous232 and the companion case Stew-
art233 is also suggestive. Cory J. described Theophanous as displaying
a marked reluctance on the part of the Australian High Court to
tamper with the existing common law rule.234 On the contrary, the
226 See Bollinger, The Tblerant Society (1986).
227 See generally, Smolla, Suing the Press: Libel, the Media, and Power (1986). It
has even been suggested that Sulliuan has led to a decline in investigative reporting:
see Marshall and Gilles, "The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, and Bad Jour-
nalism", [1994] Sup. Ct. Rev. 169.
228 Cory J. also cited Justice White's subsequent rejection of the rule (White J.
was a member of the majority opinion in New York Times) in Dun & Bradstreet Inc. u.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
229 Hill, supra, note 214, at para. 137.
..,0 Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem ofFree Speach, (1993), at 159-162.
231 See the discussion in Smolla, "Taking Libel Reform Seriously" (1987), 38 Mer-
cer L. Rev. 793.
232 Theophanous u. Herald & Weekly Times (1994), 124 A.L.R. 1 (H.C.).
233 Stephens u. West Australian Newspapers Ltd. (1994), 124 A.L.R. 80 (H.C.).
234 "Although a plurality of the seven judges sitting on the High Court held that
the existing law of defamation curtailed the constitutionally protected right to political
discussion, it rejected the adoption of the 'actual malice' standard": [1995] 2 S.C.R.
1130, at para. 135.
Court concluded that the common law did not strike a fair balance
between free political discussion and the protection of reputation
(this, in a country without a written Bill of Rights).235 The case con-
cerned a member of the House of Representatives suing the press for
publishing a defamatory letter to the editor critical of the plaintiff's
record as Chairperson of the Standing Committee on Immigration.
The Court accepted that the common law of defamation could
"inhibit the exercise of freedom of communication" (the chilling-
effect argument)236 but did shy away from adopting the actual malice
standard. Instead,_ a mid-way point was found by allowing a defen-
dant to escape liability if "circumstances were such as to make it rea-
sonable to publish the impugned material without ascertaining
whether it was true or false". A publisher would be required to show
that:
... in the circumstances which prevailed, it acted reasonably, either by
taking some steps to check the accuracy of the impugned material or by
establishing that it was otherwise justified in publishing without taking
such steps or steps which were adequate.237
As long as the defamatory statement was made concerning politi-
cal matters, was not made recklessly or with knowledge of its falsity,
and was reasonable in the circumstances, a defendant will escape
liability. This was virtually the same position put to the Court in Hill
by the intervenor the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
As concerns the defence of qualified privilege, Cory J. did admit
that the common law rule was too restrictive. Qualified privilege
rebuts the presumption that a defamatory statement was made with
malice due to the surrounding circumstances. The rule is available
when the person making the statement has a duty or interest,
whether it be legal, social or moral, to make it and the person to
whom it is made has a corresponding duty or interest to receive it.
Therefore, when a lawyer files documents with a court registrar that
contains defamatory statements, the lawyer is presumed not to have
intended to publish the statement with actual or express malice.
Morris Manning argued that the defence should be available prior to
the fIling of court proceedings, such as in the recitation of the con-
tents of a notice of motion on the court house steps. The Court,
233 See Walker, "The Impact of the High Court's Free Speech Cases on Defama-
tion Law' (1995), 17 Sydney L. Rev. 43.
23. Theophanous, supra, note 232, at 19.
237 Id., at 23.
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L'Heureux-Dube J. dissenting on this point, accepted that section
2(b) required the rule to be modified, but not so far as to relieve Man-
ning of his liability in the circumstances of the case as his "conduct
far exceeded the legitimate purposes ofthe occasion".238
The Court did not budge on the issue of damages. The jury's
assessment of damages would not be tampered with "unless it shocks.
the conscience of the court".239 Nor would the Court agree that a cap
on damages in defamation suits is necessary, as it has found in cases
of serious personal injury.240 Given the usual paucity of damage
awards in Canada for defamation, there is "no pressing social con-
cern" similar to that which required a cap on personal injury
awards.241
Indeed, the quantity of damage awards for defamation in Canada
has been cited by commentators as one reason not to modify the
existing common law rules. 242 While the facts in the Scientology case,
admittedly, are extraordinary and the unremitting campaign to
destroy Hill's reputation exceptional, it might be that the jury award
in the case will have the effect of driving up damage awards in other
cases. Even discounting the punitive and aggravated damages
awarded in the case, the sum of $300,000 in general damages surely
will have some precedential value. This has been borne out in the
next libel case the Court heard - in Botiuk, the Court affirmed an
award of $200,000 in compensatory and general damages.243
It should be kept in mind that just as all variety of expressive
activities are caught by section 2(b), an even greater variety are sub-
ject to threats of defamation suits. The strict liability approach to
defamation together with the quantum of damages, both ofwhich the
Court condones, means that both small and big presses must be cau-
tious regarding even important subjects of public concern if they
could have the effect of being defamatory. As Robert Martin has
stated, the Courts have exhibited "a distinct lack of sympathy for
'38 Hill, supra, note 234, at para. 155.
239 Id., at para.163.
24. See the personal injuries damages trilogy: Andrews u. Grand & 7by Alberta
Ltd., [1978J 2 S.C.R. 229; Arnold u. 'lImo, [1978) 2 S.C.R. 287; Thornton u. Board of
School 'Irustees ofSchool Dist. 267, [1978) 2 S.C.R. 267.
241 Hill, supra, note 234, at para. 169. In any event, the Court concluded, if a cap
similar to that on personal injury awards was in place, the general damages of
$300,000 awarded by the jury would come close to a capped award in 1991 of
$250,000: id., at para.173.
,.. Id., at para. 140, per Cory J.; Martin, supra, note 187, at 758.
'43 Botiuk u. Toronto Free Press, [19951 3 S.C.R. 3.
investigative reporting"244 and it is this form of reporting which
remains the mark ofthe alternative press.
While the effect of libel chill on large media outlets may be in
some dispute, reform of libel law would have done nothing to make
the media more accessible to those without the funds tospeak to the
community at large. But it also is true that maintenance of the sta-
tus quo does not either. Arguably, it makes matters worse. If media
barons such as Conrad Black can more effectively use the club of def-
amation so as to silence critique245 - critique which may even be
false, but reason~blymade in the circumstances - then those who
make it their concern to speak out regarding matters of public inter-
est are in a much worse position.
Lastly, the cultural arguments which have been made to support
the status quo in defamation law - that Canada is a jurisdiction less
amenable to free speech absolutism - have less import given the
rapidly concentrating and privatizing spheres of communication.24s
Not only are there fewer effective vehicles for the mass dissemina-
tion of alternative political viewpoints - consider, for example, the
privatization of public media outlets in Alberta and in Ontario _
those vehicles are being concentrated in fewer hands. As these
spaces shrink, the new communication conglomerates exercise even
wider influence. With stations such as the Cable News Network
operating in over 130 countries and conglomerate owners such as
Rupert Murdoch having access to a potential audience of two-thirds
of the world's population,247 control over the tools ofdemocratic delib-
eration remain available to only the privileged few. At the same
time, the proliferation of new vehicles for publication via Internet,
make cultural arguments even less cogent. With the globalization of
American culture and intellectual property, perhaps it is only a mat-
ter of time until legislatures in every jurisdiction in Canada are
forced to reform the Canadian law of libel so that it conforms more
closely to the American model.
... Martin, "Does Libel Have a 'Chilling Effect' in Canada?" in Martin and Adam
(eds.), A Sourcebook ofCanadian Media Law (1991), at 761.
24' See "Conrad Black Writ Large", The Globe & Mail (November 29, 1990) D1.
246 See, for example, Bryant, "Section 2(b) and Libel Law; Defamatory State.
ments About Public Officials" (1991-92), 2 M.C.L.R. 335.
247 See Barber, Jihad us. McWorld (1995), Chapter 9, at 105, 103.
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VIII. THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY: THE APPLICATION
OF THE CHARTER AND THE PuBLICIPRIVATE SPLIT
The Hill and Dagenais cases also raised key questions about the
scope of the Charter's application to judicial law-making and to
social relations between individuals within liberalism's private
sphere. Section 32 of the Charter encodes the liberal principle that
state interactions with the individuals and institutions of civil'soci-
ety should be held to a strict standard of respect for the values of
individual autonomy, equality before the law and fairness. The coun-
terpoint to that principle is the notion that the public values which
structure individual relations with the state are inappropriate in the
context of relations among persons within the private realm of civil
society. Indeed, classical liberalism views the imposition of public
values on private relationships as an interference with individual
autonomy and freedom. Thus the private is not simply different from
the public but rather the two sides of the divide mutually define ea~h
other in opposition. Although often discussed and referred to ~
starkly abstract terms, the theoretical divide between state and SOCi-
ety is premised on a set of assumptions about the institutions which
inhabit the two spheres. In short, the state is presumptively coercive
and acts through regulation. Its institutional core is its regulatory
apparatus and its fundamental character is punitive and repressive.
In direct contrast, the realm of society is presumptively pre-political,
outside of law and therefore free in the negative sense of uncon-
strained by s~te-imposed norms and restrictions. Its institutional
core is the family, the heart ofpersonal, intimate relations oflove and
affiliation, and the market, the arena of self-fulfilment through the
pursuit of self-interest. Constitutional rights are carefully calibrated
to ensure the boundary between public and private is compromised
only to the extent necessary to maintain minimum conditions of
social order and co-ordination.
The classical liberal understanding of entrenched constitutional
rights as rights against the state sketched out above tends to rein-
force notions of autonomy in terms of a negative right to privacy or
right to be "left alone", and equality in terms of formal equality or a
right to same treatment by the state notwithstanding differences in
power and privilege. As the previous sections of this essay have
emphasized, the cases this Term on the nature of equality and liberty
rights and of the fundamental freedoms in the Charter, represent ~
remarkable and disturbing shift into the political vocabulary aSSOCi-
ated with classical liberalism. Thus it is no surprise that the Court's
return to the foundational questions raised by section 32 of the
Charter confirms this trend.
In Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dol-
phin Deliuery,248 the case in which the Court first outlined its doctrinal
approach to the scope of the Charter's application under section 32,
the Court explicitly embraced the separation between state and soci-
ety and the notion that rights such as those in the Charter are
directed at protecting private persons from oppression in their rela-
tions with the Canadian state. However, rather than framing the test
of Charter application in terms of the normative and political reasons
for requiring the protection of rights in some situations and not in oth-
ers, for instance, in terms of the values which characterize state, mar-
ket and family institutions, the Court fonnulated an approach which
focused on the presence or absence of government action. By infer-
ence, it thereby endorsed the notion that public and private spheres
are constituted in opposition to each other, that is, that the one is
what the other is not. Furthermore, the Court defined government in
terms of the legislative, executive and administrative branches but
not the judicial branch. Thus, on Dolphin's account, the public sphere
mapped on to a comparatively narrow institutional notion of the state
while the private sphere converged with the judicial branch, court
orders and most of the common law. The cOII).mon law was subject to
review only to the extent that it formed the basis for something which
fit the "branch of government" notion ofthe state.
Although the descriptive nature of Dolphin's account ofthe sepa-
ration between state and society neatly sidestepped any need for an
indepth inquiry into the political coherence of the dichotomy, the
assertion that law made by judges is not a part of the state appara-
tus seemed destined to plunge courts into a swamp of endless and
absurd contradictions. In particular, the exclusion of the judicial
branch relied on the anachronistic view that judges are not making
law when settling disputes between persons in accordance with the
common law and thus the common law does not count as regulation.
As if in anticipation of the eventual problems with this untenable
position, McIntyre J., writing for the full Dolphin Court on this
point, concluded his analysis of the government action doctrine by
stating that nevertheless "judges ought to apply and develop the
principles of the common law in a manner consistent with the funda-
mental values enshrined in the Constitution."249
"'. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573.
"" Id., at 603.
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The decisions this Term form part of a line of cases which have
explored the extent to which this eX}19rtation, in spite of the govern-
ment action doctrine, effectively extends the reach of the Charter to
courts, court orders, and the common law divorced from any connec-
tion with a branch of government other than the judicial branch. In
the previous cases,250 the Court's discussion of the application issue.
has been extremely brief, often leaving one with several possible
explanations for the Charter's relevance in each particular instance.
This past term, the Court returned to the question of the Charter's
relationship to the common law on two occasions. The first case,
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. u. Dagenais,251 in many respects deep-
ens rather than removes the uncertainty created by the previous
cases. The Dagenais Court unanimously agreed that the Charter was
relevant to the common law based publication ban which was the
focus of the litigation. Nevertheless, it was divided on the question of
how the Charter's undisputed relevance to the issue does or does not
fit within Dolphin's government action test. In Hill u. Church ofSci-
entology of Thronto,252 however, the Court finally provided a lengthy
and unified consideration of the relation between the Charter and
the common law and of the meaning of McIntyre J.'s exhortation in
Dolphin.
1. Dagenais: the Demise of the Government Action Doctrine
As explained in Part VII.1 of this essay, the Dagenais case was
something of a procedural anomaly. Although it was styled as an
action between private parties, namely, between Dagenais and sev-
eral other individuals on the one hand, and the C.B.C., on the other,
and although the order for the publication ban sought by Dagenais
was based on the common law discretion of the trial judge, the issu-
ance of the ban was directly related to the conduct of criminal pro-
ceedings against the applicants. Thus the case fits comfortably, along
with a number of previous cases, into apotentially narrow "criminal
sphere" exception to the Dolphin directive that the Charter does not
apply to judicial development of the common law.253 This is truly an
250 See, e.g., Rahey u. R., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588; British Columbia Government
Employees' Union v. British Columbia (Attorney GeneralJ, [1988) 2 S.C.R. 214; R. v.
Salituro, \1991] 3 S.C.R. 654, and R. v. Swain, [1991J 1 S.C.R. 933.
251 [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835.
252 (1995) 2 S.C.R. 1130.
253 See cases cited supra, note 250.
exception that proves the rule for the criminal law is the paradigm
example of government action which can completely negate the free-
dom and autonomy of individuals. In other words, to hold that the
Charter applies to the publication ban in Dagenais is to take a
stance which arguably reinforces rather than undermines Dolphin's
adherence to the liberal principle that social life divides naturally
into public and private spheres whose funo.amental character flows
from their mutual opposition.
However, in Dagenais, only McLachlin and La Forest JJ., in sepa-
rate reasons, saw the case in this light. Justice McLachlin was the
clearest in this regard. She reaffirmed the underlying principle in Dol-
phin that constitutional rights only "applY' 'vertically' to relations
between the individual and the state".254 In spite of the broad exclu-
sion of court orders and the common law from Dolphin's notion of state
action, she found that subsequent cases support the proposition that
"court orders in the criminal sphere which affect the accused's Charter
rights or procedures by which those rights may be vindicated must
themselves conform to the Charter".255 Justice LaForest stated that he
found McLachlin J.'s comments "particularly helpful" and added the
observation that "the Queen's judges" when conducting criminal trials
are "exercising powers flowing from the sovereign as the fountain of
justice".266 Justice Gonthier wrote only two sentences on application
and remained agnostic on the main issue of how the Charter's rele-
vance fits with Dolphin's interpretation of section 32.257
Chief Justice Lamer, for the majority, pursued a different line of
an~lysis from McLachlin J. Rather than treating the Charter's appli-
catIon to the court-ordered publication ban as a logical exception to
Dolphin's exc.l~ion of judicial law-making from Charter scrutiny, he
took the poSItIon that there is no need to address the section 32
d~rect applicati?n, issue because the Charter applies indirectly by
VIrtue of Dolphm s statement that judges ought to take account of
Charter values regardless of section 32 and the government action
doctrine. In Lamer C.J.'s view, Dolphin's exhortation means that it
~as "necessary to reformulate the common-law rule governing the
Issuance of publication bans in a manner that reflects the principles
of the Charter".258 ChiefJustice Lamer added that not to do so consti-
20< Supra, note 251, at 942.
255 Id., at 944.
256 Id., at 893.
251 Id., at 918.
258 Id., at 878. (Emphasis added,)
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tutes an error of law on the face of the record sufficient to ground an
appeal or a certiorari application. Furthermore, although no one's
rights had been violated in the manner contemplated by section 24 of
the Charter, Lamer C.J. found that the remedies which would be
available under section 24 should be also available in any Charter
review ofthe common law.259 Finally, Lamer C.J. asserted that a judi-
cial reformulation of the common law of publication bans in a man-
ner consistent with Charter values should incorporate the shift in
onus as well as reflect, in substance, the considerations in the Oakes
test developed under section 1 of the Charter.260 Indeed, as discussed
in the previous sectioJ;l of this essay, Lamer C.J. added a new require-
ment to the third step in the Oakes proportionality analysis. In short,
it would appear that whether or not a government actor is somehow
linked to the issue before the courts, any decision by the courts is
subject not only to Charter review and Charter remedies but also to
the analytic framework governing Charter litigation. While Lamer
C.J.'s analysis does not permit the development of freestanding con-
stitutional torts, namely, actions brought by one private party
against another alleging damages for interference with C.harter
rights, it prevents the enforcement of common law based claIms by
one party against another where to do so would violate Charter val-
ues. McLachlin J. put it quite bluntly:
... the practical effect of the Chief Justice's approach ... may mean that all
court orders would be subject to Charter scrutiny. Even purely private lit-
igation would be subject to review on Charter grounds.261
Justice L'Heureux-Dube accepted Lamer C.J.'s basic contention
that the Charter applies to the issue in Dagenais indirectly by virtue
of McIntyre J.'s statement that Charter values ought to inform judi-
cial development of the common law.262 Thus, Lamer C.J.'s reasons
have a majority of six on that point. However, she proposed that
although the Charter does not apply to "court orders per se",263 judges
269 Id., at 866. Lamer C.J. was particularly concerned at this juncture with the
limited remedial powers of certiorari. However, he stated the rationale for ensuri~g
that the full panoply of s. 24 remedies are available through a certiorari challenge in
terms that would apply generally to any review of the consistency of the common law
with Charter values: id.
260 Id., at 878.
261 Id., at 941. (Emphasis in originaL)
262 Id., at 908-12.
2G~ Id., at 908.
can be government actors in some situations and thus find them-
selves and their activity directly subject to the Charter. In L'Heu-
reux-Dube J.'s view, this occurs when judges are exercising "their
inherent right to control their process".264 The difficulty with L'Heu-
reux-DuM J.'s distinction is raised by the Dagenais case itself. The
publication ban sought by Dagenais can plausibly be related both to
judicial management of the criminal trial process and the settlement
of a dispute between the applicants and the C.B.C.
In Dagenais, both McLachlin and L'Heureux-DuM JJ. strove to
maintain the coherence of Dolphin's government action doctrine. In
contrast, Lamer C.J.'s approach treated section 32 as superfluous.
This seems particularly startling because the ChiefJustice, with the
support of the majority, then went on to significantly alter the com-
mon law rule in light of the Charter values of freedom of expression.
Thus we seem to have moved abruptly from a world in which a very
narrow range of social relations are subject to Charter scrutiny to a
world in which everything is public in the sense that the norms of
behaviour required by Charter protections will be imposed either
directly or indirectly on the full range of issues which come before
the court. Indeed, along with the government action doctrine, the
~ajorityre~sons implicitly cast into doubt the workability of a nega-
tive conceptlOn of human freedom and the concomitant and orthodox
notion that rights enforce the separation between public and private.
However, this latter theoretical concern is dispelled by the Hill case.
2. Hill: The Reinscription of the Public/Private Split
Hill, unlike Dagenais, presented no way of easily preserving the
Dolphin vision of the scope ofCharter application and placed the prac-
tical problem raised by MacLachlin J. squarely before the Court. The
decision is also important because it presents a comparatively unified
and extensive discussion of the Charter's relationship to the common
law while revisiting and, to a certain extent, revising the decision in
Dagenais. As noted in "Libel and Slander" above, L'Heureui-Dube J.
differed from her colleagues on one point "unrelated to the section 32
issue. Otherwise the full Court agreed with the reasons of Cory J.
Hill, like Dolphin, was an action between two private parties
based on the common law of tort. The only connections to a "branch
of government" were that the plaintiff, Casey Hill, was a Crown
264 Id., at 910.
26' Supra, note 252, at para. 72.
266 Id., at para. 94.
prosecutor, the libel he was complaining of occurred in relation to his
work for the Crown, and the Attorney General may have funded his
action. On this basis, the defendants, Morris Manning and the
Church of Scientology, argued that, in fact, the case was different
from Dolphin because Hill was a government actor. Justice Cory
rejected this first prong of the defendants' claim regarding Charter
application. In doing so, he asserted that a person's reputation, even
when it relates to his or her professional reputation as a government
employee, is wholly and completely a private interest. It has no pub-
lic dimension. Cory J. stated; "Reputation is an integral and funda-
mentally important aspect of every individual. It exists for everyone
quite apart from employment.,,265
This assertion that there is something inherently and irredeem-
ably private about certain aspects of social life is the first indication
of the Court's willingness in this case to identify the substantive
political vision underlying the seemingly neutral calculations of the
"branch of government" test. In previous cases, the Court has for the
most part eschewed statements that the public/private split underly-
ing section 32 is founded on a transcendental binary division of
essential qualities and, instead, has immersed itself in the difficul-
ties of measuring linkages with government action and government
control. The claim that reputation is "integral" to the individual and
"apart from employment" sets the individual and his or her essential
attributes outside the realm of historical experience or social interac-
tion. It cuts off any argument about the particulars of political
accountability through public discourse with a claim about the onto-
logical'nature of individuality which turns out, in this case, to encom-
pass the professional achievements of a successful prosecutor of
offences against the state.
In the course of positioning the Hill case on the private side of the
public/private divide, Cory J. presented a new map ofthe cases which
attempted, unsuccessfully, to reconcile the freshly revealed.transcen-
dental nature of the divide with the government action doctrine. On
one side are the "essentially public" cases, namely, caSeS in which
"the court was called upon to consider the operations of the court and
to determine the extent of its own jurisdiction to consider matters
which were essentially public in nature.,,266 This is where Cory J.
located, among others, the Dagenais case. He did not explain what
261 Id:
268 Id.
269 Id., at para. 95.
270 !d., at para. 98. This appears to contradict the statement by the majority in
DagenaIS that the party defending a publication ban issued under common law
authority must defend its reasonableness in the face of a successful s. 2(b) challenge:
supra, note 251, at 890-91.
271 S
upra, note 252, ~t para. 96. However, any far reaching changes by the legis-
lature are, of course, subject to presumably less cautious Charter review under the
government action doctrine.
unites these decisions under the "essentially public" rubric except to
say that they are cases in which the state is acting and thus has con-
s~titutional duties. He characterized them as presenting "a very spe-
Cific type of 'government action' in a civil context".267 On the other
side of the map, Cory J. placed Dolphin and Hill, cases which he
described as "purely private".268 The "essentially public". cases
involve rights and duties because they involve a state actor. The
"purely, p~vate" case~ ~nvolve Charter values rather than rights. In
Cory J. s View, Dolphm s statement that court orders are not subject
to Charter scrutiny is preserved not only by the rights/values dichot-
?my but al~o by" the fact that in the "context of civil litigation involv-
mg only pnvate parties, the Charter will 'apply' to the common law
only to the extent that the common law is found to be inconsistent
with <?harter va~ues".269 In addition, and perhaps more convincingly,
the dIchotomy IS reflected in methodological differences. Justice
Cory suggested that the now orthodox two-stage framework for
Charter analysis first set out in Oakes must be adjusted in the
"~urely private" cases because of the absence of a state party to pro-
VIde the section 1 justificatory analysis. As parties relying on the
common law rule should not have to defend its reasonableness, Cory
J. stated the burden should lie on the party challenging the common
law rule both to prove an inconsistency with Charter values and to
demonstrate the unreasonableness of the inconsistency.27o Further-
mor~, Cory J. advised that courts have been and will be extremely
cautIOUs about amending the common law, leaving far reaching
changes to the legislature.271
~us~i~e Cory's category of a "very specific type of government
action IS as unhelpful and perplexing as UHeureux-Dube J.'s
category of "certain judicial conduct" and, like L'Heureux-DuM
J:, .he was ultimately unwilling to relinquish the Dolphin propo-
SItIon that the common law converges with liberalism's private
sphere of social relations. For both of them, it required the addi-
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tion of "specific action" or "certain conduct" to transf?rm the c~m­
mon law into government action. In the. end, C?ry J. s rem~ppm,g
of the essentially public and purely private, hke McLachhn J. s
criminal sphere exception, draws its coherence not from for~~l
differences between branches of government but from the pohtl-
cal vision of classical liberalism. In effect, Dolphin and Hill
belong together not so much because the common la~ on whic~
they are based converges magically and perfe~tly wIth a tradI-
tional notion of the private sphere, but because m those cases the
applicable legal rules give formal legitimacy to dis~ribut~~ns of
power which are presumed to pre-exist !aw and the Imp~sltlOnof
the political structure of the state. In Hlll, as stated earher, ~epu­
tational interests and professional achievements are ontologIc~l1y
prior to politics; in Dolphin, by inference, capital accumulatIOn
through the exercise of "natural" rights of property and contract
is ontologically prior to politics.272 . .
However, the political logic underlying Cory J.'s categones seems
to be completely compromised by his acceptance of the second prong
of the defendants' argument on the application issue that Charter
values nevertheless apply to private sphere relations. Cory J.'s
rights/values dichotomy and his assertion that c~nsistency of the
common law with the Charter preserves the pnvate sphere are
unconvincing, particularly against the backdrop of the significant
alteration of the common law in Dagenais. Indeed, apart .from the
proposition that the Charter applies indirectly to the common law,
contradictions seem to proliferate when one compares the two cases.
In Dagenais, the Charter challenge to the common law ~as s~ccess­
ful and resulted in an alteration to reflect the greater weIght given to
freedom of expression in the Charter. In spite of protestations that
there is no hierarchy of rights in the Charter,273 freedom of expres-
sion was portrayed as a "paramount value in Can~di~ society" by
the Dagenais majority and its linkage to the functlOnmg of de~oc­
racy was emphasized by quotations to that effect from preVIOUS
'" Another aspect of the difficulty with relying on the common law and ju.dicial
law-making as a proxy for traditional notions of the private sphere, especially m the
age of the regulatory state, emerged in Young u. Young, [19931 4 S.C.R. 3..In th~t case,
the Court is presented with a quintessentially private issue, namely, fanuhal disputes
concerning child custody, which has been subject to what is usually the most u.ncon-
troversial form of government action, namely, legislative regulatio~. See th~ dl~CUS­
sion in Bakan, Ryder, Schneiderman and Young, "Developments m ConstitutiOnal
Law: The 1993-94 Term" (1995), 6 S.C.L.R. 67 at 70-77.
213 [1994] 2 S.C.R. 835 at 877.
Charter cases.274 In Hill, however, the application of the Charter
resulted in an affirmation of the balance struck by the common law
of defamation between the value of individual privacy and that of
freedom of expression. Indeed, although the language of "balance"
was used throughout,275 it seems clear that in Hill the reputational
privacy of the individual was paramount. In addition, as ifto deepen
the contrast between the two cases, the jurisprudential tradition of
limiting freedom of expression was emphasized. In fact, Cory J. char-
acterized defamatory speech as harmful to democracy276 whereas
with respect to reputational privacy he wrote:
Democracy has always recognized and cherished the fundamental impor-
tance of an individual. That importance must, in turn, be based upon the
good repute of a person. It is that good repute which enhances an individ-
ual's sense of worth and value. False allegations can so very quickly and
completely destroy a good reputation. A reputation tarnished by a libel
can seldom regain its former lustre. A democratic society, therefore, has
an interest in ensuring that its members can enjoy and protect their good
reputation so long as it is merited.277
Justice Cory went on to postulate that although no single provi-
sion in the Charter explicitly recognizes reputational privacy as a
protected right, it is "a concept which underlies all the Charter
rights"278 and is captured in the notion of human dignity. Further-
more, Cory J. suggested that the fact that lawyers have a greater
stake in their reputations than other individuals must be considered
when weighing freedom of expression values.279 Thus, it would
appear, the constitutional principle of human dignity is more deeply
compromised when lawyers rather than others with less tradeable
credentials are defamed.
In order to place the Hill and Dagenais decisions in a framework in
which they make political ifnot doctrinal sense, one must return to the
larger features of the substantive political vision which emerges with
increasing clarity in all of the Charter cases released by the Supreme
Court of Canada this Term. In particular, one must return to the fea-
tures ofthe political actor who stands at the centre of classical liberal-
.ism's account of the mutual opposition between the. public and private
27< [d., at 876-77.
27. [1995J 2 S.C.R 1130, at paras. 97, 100, 107 and 121.
27. [d., at para. 106.
277 [d., at para. 108.
278 [d., at para. 120.
279 [d., at para. 118.
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spheres. This acquisitive self-interested individual, who, in many
respects, is socially male, shapes the priorities and commitments
within both ~pheres. Both must reflect his "private" investments in the
traditional family, professional authority, and a proprietary notion of
self-worth and self-fulfillment. As discussed in "Publication Bans"
above, the claimant in Dagenais had no such recognizable stake; as a .
criminal accused he forfeited any entitlement to individual privacy
except to the extent that it is subsumed within the Charter and com-
mon law protections directed at the procedural propriety of the trial
process. The majority listed individual privacy as only one of 14 factors
which should inform the issuance of a publication ban.28o In addition,
notwithstanding the fact that Dagenais was invoking a constitutional
right to a fair trial, the majority characterized him as "seeking to use
the power of the state to achieve this objective".281 By inference, the
C.B.C.'s control of the means of expression exists outside oflaw and is
entitled to protection from interference by the state. Thus, media inter-
ests step into the shoes of the individual rights holder whose prefer-
ences and priorities are cast as paramount. Because' the
acquisitiveness and achievements of this individual are integral to its
being, and are, as in Dolphin and Hill, ontologically prior to politics,
freedom of the press translates into the freedom of large corporate
media interests to increase their purchase on the public space of politi-
cal discourse and only incidentally, if at all, does it translate into the
political accountability of the justice system. In this sense, the trium-
phant individual who stands for the vindication ofreputational privacy
in Hill is a mirror image of the individual who stands behind the rhe-
toricallinkage between a free press and democracy in Dagenais.
Section 32 is indeed superfluous, not because Charter jurispru-
dence and the common law necessarily and seamlessly reflect each
other, but because, in these cases, both are being reformulated in
accordance with the same set of values. The balancing of values
within both regimes firmly reinscribes the public\ private split which
underlies the formal language of "branch of government" in section
32 and the various doctrinal measuring sticks generated by the gov-
ernment action doctrine. Indeed, behind the contradictory surfaces
presented by Hill and Dagenais lies perhaps the most important
political actor of all, namely, an activist judiciary riding the wave of
the latest resurgence of classical liberalism in the broader arena of
Canadian and global politics.
28. Supra, note 273, at 882-83.
281 [d., at 891.
IX. CONCLUSION
Our emphasis on the emergence of the combination of abstract
individualism and conservative moral ordering as the central theme
of constitutional interpretation is at odds with some other analyses
of the Charter. F.L Morton and Rainer Knopf, for example, have
identified a very different "ideological bias"282 in Charter interpreta-
tion, one which is opposed to conservative views and decidedly in
favour of "new citizen interest groups" which have "sprung up" as a
result of the Charter.283 Morton and Knopf argue that these groups,
whom they have labelled "the court party", are able to use litigation
to extract from courts concessions favourable to their interests. In
their view, the success of the "court party" speaks to the "weakness
of the Charter as text"284 and the departure of judicial review from
its "traditional character as a conservative check on democratic
change".285
Even before this Term, the court party thesis appeared to us to
grandly overstate the legal and political power of disadvantaged
groupS.286 Mter reviewing this Term's cases, we are left with little
doubt that the current Court is exhibiting no symptoms of being a
captive of Charter interest groups. Indeed, a formidable array of
intervenors who would likely be characterized as members of the
"court party" by Morton and Knopf had their Charter positions deci-
sively rejected by a majority of the Supreme Court: Equality for
Gays and Lesbians Everywhere (EGALE) (in Egan), Support and
Custody Orders for Priority Enforcement (SCOPE) (in Thibaudeau),
the Native Women's Association of Canada (in NWAC), the Charter
Committee on Poverty Issues (in Prosper and Matheson), and the
Canadian Civil Liberties Association and a host of writers' and
media groups (in Hill). It is only a slight exaggeration to say that
locating the litigants with a "court party" intervenor on their side
282 Morton, "The Charter Revolution and the Court Party" (1992), 20 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 627 at 634. See also Knopf and Morton, Charter Politics (1992).
283 [d., at 630.
284 [d., at 651.
286 Morton and Knopf, "The Supreme Court as Vanguard of the Intelligentsia:
The Charter Movement as Postmaterialist Politics" in Ajzenstat (ed.), Canadian Con-
stitutionalism: 1791-1991 (1992), at 61.
286 For a critique of the Morton and Knopfview, and a more sophisticated evalu-
~tion of Charter politics, see Herman, "The Good, the Bad, and the Smugly: Perspec-
tives on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1994),14 Ox. J. Leg. Stud.
589.
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would be a reliable means of identifying the failed Charter claimants
this Term.
The Court's decisions do confirm the view that "[w]hile in theory
constitutional law constrains politics, in practice, politics shapes con-
stitutional development."287 The text ofthe Charter is flexible enough
to accommodate a wide range of political theories and legal interpre-.
tations: witness the three very different approaches to section 15
taken by the justices in the equality trilogy. The Court this Term has
chosen not to infuse the vague language of the text with meanings
that favour social movements or depart from traditional moral order-
ing. Instead, the Court adhered to conceptions of society which
reflect the "dominant" view of the individual's relationship to the
state and society. As a result, most Charter claims by litigants aim-
ing to nudge political practice in the direction of a mor.§":tolerant and
just society ended up receiving a chilly disposition fr~m the Court
this Term.
281 Morton, supra, note 282, at 650.
